THE PROCEEDINGS

of

The South Carolina Historical Association

1971

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The South Carolina Historical Association supplies the *Proceedings* to all its members. The Executive Committee elects the Editor. Beginning in 1935, every fifth number contains an index for the preceding five years.

THE PROCEEDINGS
of
The South Carolina Historical Association
1971

LOWRY P. WARE
Editor

CLINTON
THE SOUTH CAROLINA
HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION

THE FORTY-FIRST ANNUAL MEETING SOUTH CAROLINA HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION

The forty-first annual meeting of the South Carolina Historical Association was held on Saturday, April 3, 1971, at Clemson University. Approximately 75 members and guests attended one or more of the programs.

Following registration in the faculty room, Strode Tower, the first session was called to order at 9:45 a.m. in Olin Hall Auditorium, President Henry von Hasseln presiding. Following a short welcoming address by President Edwards of Clemson, Diane Neal of the same university read a paper on "Ben Tillman: No Apologies for Lynching" which was discussed by Joseph H. Killian, Wofford College. Selden K. Smith, Columbia College, then read a paper entitled "Cotton Ed Smith's Response to Economic Adversity" which was discussed by John J. Duffy, University of South Carolina.

A buffet luncheon was served at 12:30 p.m. in the campus dining room, after which the annual business meeting was held. The minutes of the last meeting were approved as printed in *The Proceedings* and the Treasurer's report, copies of which were distributed at the luncheon, was adopted. Professor C. W. Bolen, for the Executive Committee, presented the following slate of officers for 1971-1972:

President: Ronald D. Burnside, Presbyterian College
Vice-President: J. M. Lesesne, Jr., Wofford College
Secretary-Treasurer: Richard M. Gannaway, Converse College
Executive Committee Member (term to expire 1974): Robert Weir, University of South Carolina

There were no nominations from the floor, and the motion that the slate be accepted by acclamation was seconded and passed. It was announced that Dr. Ware would continue to serve as Editor of *The Proceedings* next year.

In Dr. J. M. Lesesne, Jr.'s absence, Dr. George C. Rogers gave a brief report on the activities of the Tricentennial Commission. He stated that three tourist centers appropriately located on inter-state highways, would be operating by July 1st under the State Department of Parks and Tourism. He stated further that thirteen historical works had been published to date and that a new one-volume history

of South Carolina would probably be published in 1972—all with assistance from the sub-committee on publications.

Dr. Ware read a tribute to Dr. Bernard Poole, active member of the Association during his long service at Erskine College. The motion was made, seconded, and passed unanimously that the tribute be made an official part of these minutes, that it be printed in *The Proceedings*, and that a copy be sent to surviving members of Dr. Poole's family.

After announcing that the 1972 meeting of the Association would be held at Columbia College, the date to be confirmed later, President von Hasseln called on President-Elect Burnside who thanked Clemson University for its hospitality and cited the excellent work of the local arrangements committee, chaired by Professor C. W. Bolen. Dr. Burnside also announced that guided tours of the nearby Duke Power Company Keowee-Toxaway Project would be conducted following the afternoon session.

The second session began at 2:30 p.m. in Olin Hall Auditorium. Papers read were "Executive Powers and Foreign Relations: The Neutrality Acts Revisited" by Jamie Moore, The Citadel, discussed by Hewitt D. Adams, Clemson University; and "America, Germany, and the Cold War, 1945-1949" by Birdsall Viault, Winthrop College, discussed by Henry Lumpkin, University of South Carolina.

Preceded by a social hour, the Banquet Session was convened in The Clemson House at 7:30 p.m. Following dinner, Dr. George B. Tindall, Kenan Professor of History at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, read a paper entitled "Southern Strategy: A Historical Perspective."

There being no further business, the meeting was adjourned.

BERNARD L. POOLE

1908-1971

Bernard L. Poole was born in Norfolk, Va. on January 2, 1908. He attended Choate School and graduated from Yale University in 1931. During the rest of the decade he was engaged in various business activities, and in the Second World War he served in the U. S. Air Force. After the war he began an academic career by taking a Masters' in Spanish at the University of Illinois, and it was as an instructor in Spanish that he came to the University of South Carolina in 1946. Two years later he began graduate study in history which in 1950 led to a PhD. The following year the University of South Carolina Press published his doctoral thesis, *The Caribbean Commission.*

For one year he taught history at Georgia Teachers College at Statesboro, Ga., and from 1951 to 1956 he taught at the College of Charleston. From 1956 until his death, January 2, 1971, he was Professor of History and head of the department of History at Erskine College. There he continued his interest in Latin America, and in 1957 was the co-author of *The Caribbean*: *British, Dutch, French, United States*, a volume published by the University of Florida Press. When his teaching duties turned his attention toward political science, in 1961 he produced a volume on the *Basic Minimum of American Government* which he used as a text book.

His interest in teaching more than matched his devotion to scholarship, and students were attracted by his distinctive blend of formality and wit.

For two decades Bernard Poole was an active member of the South Carolina Historical Association, and his passing is a distinct loss to this body as well as to the historical profession in South Carolina.

BEN TILLMAN—NO APOLOGIES FOR LYNCHING

DIANE NEAL

Ben Tillman's views concerning lynching have stimulated much comment both from his contemporaries and from historians. Often repeated statements such as "Whenever the Constitution comes between me and the virtue of the white women of the South, I say to hell with the Constitution"[1] convinced many of his contemporaries that Tillman was the South's foremost champion of lynch law. Later historians have generally shared this opinion, but most of them note that as governor of South Carolina he displayed considerable anti-lynching sentiment until 1892 when he spoke openly in favor of lynching rapists. Typical of these studies are those by Francis Butler Simkins and George Brown Tindall.[2] Little attempt, however, has been made to analyze the apparent shift in views manifested by Tillman in 1892.

Most studies of lynching center on mob psychology and the relationship of education, wealth, religion, and population to the practice. Able scholars have written of the influence of the Southern "rape complex" upon lynching. In this paper an effort will be made to explore the apparent inconsistencies in Tillman's views concerning lynching and to examine those views with particular reference to Southern womanhood, sexual behavior, and racial equality.

The definition of lynching accepted here is James Harmon Chadbourn's definition of lynching as "the killing or aggravated injury of a human being by the act or procurement of a mob,"[3] with at least three persons participating in the event, and with the mob acting under the pretense of service to race, tradition, or injustice.[4] As Gunnar Myrdal notes, a distinction must be made between racial lynchings and riots. Racial riot indicates mass violence in which members of each race fight each other in unrestrained fashion,

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[1]B. R. Tillman to the editor of the New York *Sun*, November 4, 1913, Benjamin R. Tillman Papers. Robert Muldrow Cooper Library, Clemson University, Clemson, South Carolina. (All letters cited in this paper are located in this collection.)

[2]Francis Butler Simkins, *Pitchfork Ben Tillman: South Carolinian*, Baton Rouge, 1944, pp. 173-74 and 224-25; George Brown Tindall, *South Carolina Negroes, 1877-1900*, Baton Rouge, 1966, pp. 250-54.

[3]James Harmon Chadbourn, *Lynching and the Law*, Chapel Hill, 1933, p. 47.

[4]Jack Simpson Mullins, "Lynching in South Carolina, 1900-1914", unpublished M. A. thesis, University of South Carolina, 1961, p. 2.

whereas mass lynching refers to the killing or beating of a large number of members of either race as a means of terrorization.[5]

Ben Tillman's belief that rapists deserved lynching remained fundamentally unchanged throughout his political career. Exposed in the Senate to his Northern colleagues' indictment of lynch law and isolated from the mainstream of South Carolina politics, he enunciated his philosophy more clearly and forcefully than he had as governor. His addresses especially during the period of 1906-07 reveal how profoundly Tillman was affected by the Southern "rape complex." Since this attitudinal complex influenced many of his actions both as a private citizen and as governor, a detailed examination of it is necessary.

As W. J. Cash notes, the origin of this lies in the idealization of Southern womanhood which began in the Old South. Although the white masters had frequent sexual relations with their slave women, they desired to perpetuate white supremacy in legitimate lines, and for this reason they idealized women of their own race and placed them on a pedestal beyond the reach of black men. Southern white males, feeling the need of meeting the Northern charges that they were slipping into bestiality by exploiting their black servants sexually, proclaimed Southern virtue superior to any virtue on earth and pointed to Southern womanhood as proof.[6]

In the eyes of Southern whites like Tillman, the Civil War and the abolition of slavery seemed to offer to the blacks an opportunity to overthrow this taboo against sexual relations with white women. Southerners, therefore, felt that any effort on the part of blacks to gain political equality would ultimately lead to social equality and intermarriage. Thus any violation of the Southern racial code whether or not directly connected with sex could be described as rape upon the Southern woman who personified the South.[7]

Further study on aspects of the rape complex has been done by sociologist Calvin Hernton. He suggests that because the white Southern males felt attracted to female slaves they concluded that

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[5]Gunnar Myrdal, *An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy*, New York, 1944, I, 566.

[6]Wilbur J. Cash, *The Mind of the South*, New York, 1941, pp. 87-89. For a fuller discussion of sexual relations between white masters and their chattels see Winthrop Jordon, *White Over Black: American Attitudes Toward the Negro, 1550-1812*, Chapel Hill, 1968, pp. 136-167 and 557-75; Rollin G. Osterweis, *Romanticism and Nationalism in the Old South*, New Haven, 1949, pp. 54-60 and 82-102.

[7]*Ibid.*, pp. 118-19.

white women must feel a similar attraction to black men. This factor in addition to their guilt about their relationships with black women, induced them to stress the idea of pure white Southern womanhood. To justify any possible fascination that white women might feel for black males, the white Southerners accepted the idea that black men possessed greater sexual prowess than they. Somewhat contradictorily, they argued that black men repelled white women and therefore any contacts between them had to be forced by the former. Thus the white woman must be shielded from this ever present threat. A correlation to these beliefs was that black women also had very strong sexual passions and were attracted to white men. Since these women supposedly lacked high moral standards, sexual contacts between them and white men were considered voluntary and rarely was it thought that white men raped black women.[8]

As suggested earlier, the rape complex formed the basis of Tillman's philosophy of lynching. Central to it was his devotion to the pure white Southern woman as a symbol of the South. To illustrate, in 1907 he advanced his belief that the trinity of "womanhood, wifehood, motherhood" were the "noblest and holiest" words in the English language. He condemned any man who spoke lightly or flippantly of the chastity of womanhood as a "disgrace to his own mother and unworthy of a good wife."[9] Any violation of womanly virtue, he considered the most serious and despicable of crimes. He put seduction in the same class as rape when he announced that the natural protector of a woman had the right to kill her seducer, and in 1916 he urged the pardon of a white man who had shot his daughter's white seducer.[10] Referring in the same year to the lynching of rapists, he declared that "the man, white or black, who forcibly deflowers a woman, put himself outside of the pale of the law" and deserves summary killing.[11]

However, his respect for feminine virtue did not extend wholly to black women. He proposed that black people as a whole lacked morals because their women "did not set ideals for the men to follow as in the white man's realm."[12] While in numerous speeches he af-

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[8]Calvin C. Hernton, *Sex and Racism in America*, New York, 1965, pp. 16-17 and 110-12.

[9]U. S. Congress, Senate, Senator Tillman speaking on the race question, 59th Cong. 2nd sess., January 21, 1907, *Congressional Record*, LI, 1441.

[10]B. R. Tillman to Richard I. Manning, December 11, 1916 in Tillman Papers.

[11]B. R. Tillman to Almonico T. Gary, May 26, 1916, *Ibid.*

[12]Unidentified newspaper clipping, Scrapbook 11 (1906-07), Benjamin R. Tillman Papers. Robert Muldrow Cooper Library, Clemson University, Clemson, South Carolina. (All scrapbooks cited are located in this collection.)

firmed his belief that any man who had ravished a woman of either race deserved lynching, one can question his sincerity in this regard for in 1914 when confronted with the attempted rape of a black woman by a black male he did not suggest that the culprit be lynched. Instead he predicted that the man would probably be imprisoned or possibly legally sentenced to death.[13] To him most black women possessed loose morals and welcomed sexual contacts almost indiscriminately; therefore rapes upon them were few.

Tillman also regarded black men as possessors of animal-like sexual passions. In one of his speeches in 1907 he denounced black rapists as "lurking demons who . . . watched for the opportunity to ravish lovely young white maidens."[14] Since he pictured all black men as potential brutes or fiends, earlier the same year he had opposed sending black soldiers to serve in the Philippines because doing so would place the Filipino women at their mercy. He announced that they should be kept in the United States where summary justice should be meted out to them *as soon as* they committed outrages upon women. If possible, they should all be mustered out of the armed forces.[15]

Why, Tillman asked, had the black men developed into such brutes? In many of his public addresses in 1906-1907, he suggested that the answer lay in the ideas of social equality which the Republicans had been feeding them since Reconstruction. During slavery days, black people accepted their inferiority and did not attempt to mingle socially with the whites. But, giving blacks political equality through the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments had imbued them with the desire to gain social equality including the right to intermarry with the whites. To complicate the South's racial problem, many white men according to Tillman were crossing the color line sexually in defiance of the customs forbidding racial amalgamation, leaving the white women to safeguard the purity of the race. "We must," Tillman insisted, "protect our women at any and all hazards else they would spurn us and . . . we must draw the line of caste between white men and black women and sternly compel its observance, just as sternly as we are resolved to draw the line between black men and white women."[16]

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[13]B. R. Tillman to B. R. Tillman, Jr., August 18, 1914 in Tillman Papers.
[14]Senator Tillman, January 21, 1907, *Congressional Record*, LI, 1441.
[15]Columbia *State*, January 7, 1907.
[16]Augusta *Chronicle*, October 7, 1906, Scrapbook 11 (1906-07) in Tillman Papers.

Tillman's solution for the problems of lynching and raping was to repeal the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments—the first step in eradicating the ideas of political and social equality from the minds of blacks. With the repeal of these guarantees of the blacks' legal rights, they could be completely subjugated and their movements placed under strict police regulation.[17] Racial hostility, he continued, would cease as the blacks again accepted their social and political inferiority and abstained from attacks on white women. Since Tillman believed that lynching for deeds other than rape rarely occurred, in 1916 he predicted that lynch law would then virtually disappear in the South.[18]

Having examined Tillman's philosophy of lynching, the question remains of how consistent he was in putting these beliefs into practice as both a private citizen and a chief executive of South Carolina.

Ben Tillman's first connection with lynching came during the racial disturbances which marred the election of 1876. A devout and apparently sincere believer in the inherent inferiority of black people, Tillman regarded the limited participation by blacks in government during Reconstruction as the worst possible form of tyranny. As a member of the Edgefield Sweetwater Sabre Club, he played an active role in several racial incidents. As he later reminisced, he did not actually kill any blacks although he claimed to have made one attempt during the course of the so-called Hamburg Riot. He did at that time, moreover, aid the men who lynched six black militiamen by lending his gun to one of them.[19] Far from feeling shame for his actions, Tillman boasted of them in numerous speeches and public lectures stressing that he had only done his patriotic duty in helping to re-establish white supremacy in South Carolina.[20]

With the cooling of political and racial passions after the inauguration of Wade Hampton as governor, Tillman returned to a relatively uneventful farm life. Aroused by the economic problems which plagued South Carolina farmers during the 1870's and 1880's, he

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[17]Senator Tillman, January 12, 1907, *Congressional Record*, LI, 1444; Unidentified newspaper clipping, Scrapbook 11 (1906-07) in Tillman Papers.

[18]B. R. Tillman to Almonico T. Gary, May 26, 1916, *Ibid.*

[19]Benjamin Ryan Tillman, *The Struggles of 1876: How South Carolina was Delivered from Carpet-bag and Negro Rule: Speech at the Red-Shirt-Re-union at Anderson*, N.p., 1909, pp. 14 and 24.

[20]Columbia *State*, July 3, 1895; U. S. Congress, Senate, Senator Tillman speaking on the race question, 56th Cong., 1st sess., March 23, 1900, *Congressional Record*, XXXIII, 3223-24; 57th Cong., 1st sess., May 7, 1902, *Congressional Record*, XXXI, 5101-02.

emerged to lead the frustrated farm element in a revolt against economic exploitation by the Conservative regime. Insisting that the gubernatorial canvass of 1890 must center upon the state's economic problems, Tillman denounced his Conservative opponents, Joseph Earle and John Bratton, for interjecting national issues. Breaking away from the tradition of underscoring the Republican oppression of the state, he even dismissed Bratton's emphasis on the possibility of a new federal "force bill" as an attempt to "bamboozle the voters" into blaming Washington for their troubles.[21]

In down-playing the racial issue, Tillman repeatedly stressed that he bore no ill feeling towards black people and declared that he would "be governor of the whole people, regardless of color," and would "do justice to all."[22] Statements of this type won the support of the black farmers' alliances although he did not actually court the black vote.[23] In fact, of the gubernatorial contenders, only Alexander Haskell, who headed the Independent ticket opposing Tillman in the general election, made a direct appeal for black support.[24]

With race serving as a strictly secondary issue in the campaign, Tillman easily perpetuated the Conservative tradition of denouncing lynching. Since Haskell's racial policy tempted only blacks and a very few whites, there was no reason for Tillman to play upon racial prejudice, for his moderate racial stand would draw support from both moderate whites and Negrophobes. He could well afford to concentrate upon his economic program which attracted farmers of both races.

Shortly before beginning his campaign, Tillman had even emerged as an opponent of lynch law. As the foreman of an Edgefield County grand jury in May, 1890, he severely castigated Governor John Peter Richardson for negligence in the lynching of Willie Leaphart in Lexington County. Later, as a gubernatorial candidate, he pledged that he would permit no such lynchings if he were elected. By capitalizing on the reaction against the lynching of an innocent man, Tillman gained additional backing.[25]

He reaffirmed this antilynching sentiment in his inaugural ad-

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[21]William James Cooper, Jr., *The Conservative Regime: South Carolina, 1877-1890*, Baltimore, 1968, p. 171.

[22]Unidentified clipping, Scrapbook 2 (1885-92) in Tillman Papers.

[23]Undated clipping, Charleston *News and Courier*, Scrapbook 4 (1890) in Tillman Papers.

[24]Cooper, *The Conservative Regime*, p. 202.

[25]Columbia *State*, April 25, 1893.

dress emphasizing that lynching was a blot on the civilization of the state and deploring the fact that blacks had usually been the victims of lynch mobs. Since the machinery of justice was controlled by whites, there was no need to resort to lynching merely because people had tired of the inefficient administration of the law. Tillman proposed revamping the court rules to eliminate "new trials granted upon technicalities" and as a "desperate remedy" empowering the governor to remove from office any sheriff who failed to protect prisoners from mob violence.[26]

Tillman's approach to lynchings during the early half of his first administration appears consistent with the position taken at his inauguration. In his message to the legislature in early December, 1891, he boasted that no lynchings had occurred because he had called out the militia twice to forestall possible lynchings.[27] Later in that month, the first lynching of his administration occurred. When notified of the probability of the lynching of accused murderer, Dick Lundy, he promptly ordered the militia to protect the prisoner. After his wholehearted efforts had proved unsuccessful, he reiterated his request for authority to remove negligent sheriffs claiming that without this power, he was impotent against mob demands.[28]

In February, 1892, however, as his re-election campaign drew near Tillman cast doubt upon the sincerity of his antilynching views by appointing Calhoun Caughman, who had led the mob that lynched Leaphart, to the position of executor of the fish laws in Georgetown. He even proclaimed that there was "no blot or smirch" on Caughman's record.[29]

In the absence of conclusive evidence, this writer assumes that the political situation was probably the key factor in the reversion of Tillman to his original position. Although Tillman himself was immensely popular, the still predominantly conservative legislature had blocked much of his economic program. He determined that the election would not only return him to the governorship but would also replace this legislative "driftwood" with a group favorable to his

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[26]Benjamin Ryan Tillman, "Inaugural Aldress of B. R. Tillman Governor of South Carolina, delivered at Columbia, S. C., December 4, 1890," pp. 5-6.

[27]B. R. Tillman, "Message of B. R. Tillman, Governor to the General Assembly of the State of South Carolina, Regular Session, 1891," pp. 28-29.

[28]South Carolina, *Journal of the Senate of the General Assembly of the State of South Carolina, Being the Regular Session Commencing November 24, 1891*, p. 228; Charleston *News and Courier*, Dec. 11, 1891; Columbia *State*, December 8, 10, 15, 1891.

[29]Columbia *State*, April 25, 1893.

program. To effect his massive plan, he was willing to play upon racial as well as economic tensions.[30] Tillman's decision to capitalize on the Negrophobic and pro-lynching views of many of his white constituents also gave him the opportunity to voice his own private beliefs in the inherent inferiority of blacks and in the necessity of lynching for rape.

Despite this apparent decision, erratic behavior towards lynching characterized his campaign. On the one hand, he repeatedly testified that he as governor would lead a mob "to lynch a negro that would ravish a white woman. "I do justify lynching for rape," he continued, "and before Almighty God, I am not ashamed of it."[31] In these same speeches, however, he still urged that the governor be empowered to remove sheriffs who allowed prisoners to be lynched.[32] He also denounced lynch law as one of the "principal causes why capital was afraid to come into South Carolina."[33]

A statistical study of the rate of industrial growth in South Carolina during the 1890's signifies that there is some validity to Tillman's charge that lynching was discouraging investment in the state. Census records reveal that the number of industries in counties where lynchings did not materialize increased by 9% between 1890 and 1900 over the counties where lynchings occurred.[34] Industrially backward counties tended to encourage lynching because their educational and per capita wealth levels remained low; and as Arthur Raper notes, lynching rates are higher in counties where cultural and economic institutions are unstable and officers of the law are far apart, poorly paid, and dependent upon local sentiment.[35]

Surely, Tillman recognized the strong correlation between lynching and non-industrialized areas. Since he as governor was responsible for bringing industry into the state, he had to eradicate or at least curb lynching and its accompanying destruction of property before he could effectively portray South Carolina as a desirable place for investment. Thus while the difference in the rate of industrializa-

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[30]Simkins, *Pitchfork Ben Tillman*, p. 196.

[31]Columbia *State*, June 8, 1892, *Charleston News and Courier*, July 7, 11, 1892.

[32]Columbia *State*, June 8, 1892.

[33]Charleston *News and Courier*, July 11, 1892.

[34]U. S., Department of the Interior, Bureau of the Census, *The United States at the Eleventh Census, 1890: Report on Manufacturing Industries*, II, 586 and *Twelfth Census of the United States, 1900: Manufactures*, VIII, 832.

[35]Arthur F. Raper, *The Tragedy of Lynching*, Chapel Hill, 1933, p. 1.

tion is not a conclusive reason for Tillman's denunciation of lynching, it is a very plausible motive.

Throughout the remainder of his gubernatorial career, Tillman continued to display the same inconsistent behavior regarding lynching. For example, when the news of the unexpected lynching of Dave Shaw for larceny in June, 1892, reached Tillman, he seemed staggered by the event and offered a reward of $500 for the apprehension and conviction of each of the lynchers, but limited the total reward to $2000 although evidence indicated that at least fifteen or twenty men had actively participated in the killing.[36]

Another interesting incident occurred in July, 1892, when the angered husband of a white woman assaulted by a black man near Irmo asked Tillman to head a lynching party. Instead of fulfilling his promises to lead such a mob, he called out the militia to safeguard the accused and talked of convening a special session of court to try him.[37] The question of why Tillman did not respond as he had pledged cannot be conclusively answered. Most probably, he thought that the active participation of the governor in a lynch mob would damage the state's reputation irreparably and would discourage further industrial development. The Columbia *State* suggested as a possible explanation that Tillman made his sensational promises in order to cement support among his Negrophobic constituents without ever intending to abide by his assertions.[38] His other anti-lynching actions included calling out the militia to prevent at least four lynchings in 1893—two involving accused murderers and two accused rapists.[39] He also offered rewards for the capture and conviction of the men who participated in three lynchings while he was in New York in June, 1894.[40]

On other occasions, there was nothing commendable in Tillman's behavior. Sometimes he ignored sheriffs' pleas for help in preventing threatened lynchings,[41] and once he virtually connived with a lynching party. This last episode occurred in April, 1893, when he disregarded John Peterson's request for protection against Denmark citizens enraged over the rape of a white woman. Tillman sent Peterson

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[36]Columbia *State*, June 5, 6, 1892.
[37]*Ibid.*, July 29, 1892, Aug. 2, 1892.
[38]*Ibid.*, Aug. 2, 1892.
[39]*Ibid.*, April 23, 26, 1893; and September 28, 1893; Charleston *News and Courier*, October 2, 1893.
[40]Columbia *State*, June 9, 1894.
[41]*Ibid.*, January 29, 1893, April 26, 1893; Charleston *News and Courier*, October 2, 1893; D. J. Bradham to B. R. Tillman, July 15, 1894 in Tillman Papers.

with only one guard to the town to face a mob determined to lynch someone for the crime. After the lynching, Tillman disclaimed any blame for it claiming that he felt that Peterson would have escaped harm had he been innocent. Although he authorized an investigation of the event, he offered no reward for the capture of the lynchers. He evidently felt no shame or guilt over the loss of a human life—especially one whose culpability was doubtful. Instead he averred that if the Columbians who condemned the lynching at Denmark so strongly realized "the lonely roads over which the women of the country have to pass," then they would understand "the feeling of the men of Barnwell County which made them lynch that negro."[42]

Tillman's last opportunity to have a direct impact upon lynching in South Carolina came during the state constitutional convention of 1895. In proposing various measures for the curbing of lynch law, he declared that the delegates were dealing with a "desperate case" and must act accordingly. He successfully worked for the adoption of a resolution giving the governor authority to remove sheriffs who neglected to protect their prisoners from mob violence. He also obtained a provision making counties in which lynchings occurred liable for damages up to $2000. Despite his efforts to secure the adoption of these measures, he recognized that few verdicts would be brought against lynchers because passions would prevent most jurors from convicting fellow townsmen who participated in lynchings.[43]

From this mass of seemingly contradictory statements and actions, several conclusions are apparent to this writer. First, feeling that his political fortunes at times necessitated compromising his fundamental belief in the need of lynching for rape, Tillman attempted to keep his actions in tune with the most prevalent views in South Carolina. His opposition to lynch law during the campaign of 1890 and his support of it in 1876 and 1892 generally illustrate this point. Although he privately and sometimes publically sanctioned the lynching of rapists, he recognized that lynchings contributed to the impression of lawlessness and thus discouraged possible capital investment in the state. Therefore, in order to court potential investors,

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[42]Columbia *State*, May 3, 1893.

[43]South Carolina, Constitution, art. 6, sec. 6; Charleston *News and Courier*, Nov. 10, 1895, p. 1 and Nov. 13, 1895, p. 4; South Carolina, *Journal of the Constitutional Convention of the State of South Carolina Begun to be Holden at Columbia, S. C., on Tuesday the Tenth Day of September, Anno Domini, Eighteen Hundred and Ninety-five and Continued with Divers Adjournments until Wednesday, the Fourth Day of December, Anno Domini, Eighteen Hundred and Ninety-five, When Finally Adjourned*, pp. 123, 417, 513, 529 and 656-57.

he had to condemn lynch law and take positive measures against it.

On the other hand, his repeated references to the inadequacy of the South Carolina courts and law enforcement indicates that Tillman, despite his firm belief in state rights, did not trust South Carolinians to establish and maintain an efficient and fair judicial system. In the absence of conclusive evidence, the question of why Tillman manifested an inferiority complex concerning his state's legal institutions cannot be definitively answered at present. Possible explanations include a distrust in the effacy of all legal administration of justice or doubt as to the ability of white South Carolinians to formulate an impartial, workable judicial machinery.

The conflict between his own views, his gubernatorial responsibilities, and his political ambitions resulted in inconsistent actions and pronouncements. However, once in the Senate outside the main current of South Carolina politics, Tillman felt safe in presenting his philosophy of lynching in public addresses. After the constitutional convention of 1895, he never deviated from this theme: "I have always advocated lynching for rape everywhere and under all circumstances."[44]

[44]B. R. Tillman to the editor of the New York *Sun*, November 4, 1913 in Tillman Papers.

"COTTON ED" SMITH'S RESPONSE TO ECONOMIC ADVERSITY

SELDEN K. SMITH

The economic boom generated by World War I brought to the South a taste of affluence unknown since 1860. In South Carolina, the value of all farm crops had more than tripled in the decade from 1909 to 1918. But the brief era of prosperity ended with the dramatic break in commodity prices in 1920.[1] One writer compared the South's reversal in fortune to a weekend of "economic debauchery" inevitably followed by a "gloomy Monday."[2] As conditions worsened, gloom turned to anger and bitterness.

The economic adversity of 1920 was real. The average cotton price received by farmers in 1919 was 35.6 cents per pound; in 1920 only 14 cents. Cottonseed brought $67 a ton in 1919 but averaged only $22 in 1920. The decline in the tobacco market was similar. Yields in South Carolina per acre were down to 650 pounds compared to the average of 730 in 1914 and 722 in 1919. The 1920 price per pound was only 15 cents compared to a wartime high of over 31 cents in 1918. And the year end averages partially obscured the severity of the crisis. The South Carolina farmers received 87 per cent of their annual receipts from commodities between September of 1920 and January of 1921.[3]

Disparity between expenditures and receipts compounded the economic squeeze. Overalls which sold for 82 cents in 1909 had risen to $2.63; flannel shirts had tripled in price. A barrel of flour doubled in price between 1909 and 1920 while suger prices were tripling. The 1920 crop was particularly expensive. Wages had risen more than 240 per cent above the 1909-1913 average. With board furnished, a male received about $30.50 a month for farm work in 1920 compared to $12 in 1910. Commercial fertilizers, mules, nails and plows had doubled in price during the same period.[4]

Low prices with high production costs were always intolerable, but mother nature made 1920 even more difficult. A late winter and

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[1] *Yearbook of Agriculture, 1918*, Washington, 1919, p. 670.
[2] Quoted in George Brown Tindall, *The Emergence of the New South, 1913-1945*, Vol. X of *A History of the South*, Baton Rouge, 1967, p. 56.
[3] *Yearbook of Agriculture, 1920*, pp. 647, 803-04, 813.
[4] *Ibid.*, pp. 725, 808-25.

torrential rains delayed cotton planting and seeds rotted in the ground. Cold nights and frost in the spring took their toll of young plants. Forty per cent of the cotton crop had to be replanted. In consequence of weather conditions on this late crop, boll weevil infestation was very high.[5]

The national economy was in a period of readjustment jolted by the dramatic reduction in federal expenditures following the war. The pre-war sixty-fourth Congress (1915-1917) had appropriated $3,500,000,000; the sixty-fifth and the first session of the sixty-sixth Congresses (1917-1919), known as the "war congresses," had provided a whopping $43,400,000,000,[6] but the economy-minded second session of the sixty-sixth Congress (1919-1920) had slashed appropriations to only $4,700,000,000. Retrenchment meant to the farmers cutbacks in crop reporting services, disease control, research, and the assistance of the agricultural experiment stations. Even funds for the politically popular distribution of free seeds were pared by two-thirds.[7] Foreign demand for agricultural products declined and domestic unemployment rose to over ten per cent of the work force by 1921.[8] With all these negative factors converging, nineteen-twenty was indeed a bad year.

The farmers of the South were outraged and they let the country know about it. In October 1920 reports of "night riders" were frequent in Texas, Arkansas, Alabama, Florida, Georgia, and the Carolinas. After several cotton gins and warehouses were burned, operators resorted to the use of armed guards. Threatening notes were posted by irate farmers on ginhouses; sometimes a box of matches was found next to a warning not to open the facility until cotton was 40 cents a pound. Cotton remained unpicked in many posted fields. Reports from Atlanta indicated that many black pickers feared the Klan and therefore refused to enter the fields. Guards were hired and alarmed insurance companies cancelled policies. In South Carolina, Governor R. A. Cooper promised the full cooperation of his office with the problem and the prosecution of "night riders," reported in Anderson, Oconee, and three other counties.[9]

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[5]New York *Times* June 3, 1920. Boll weevil infestation was first identified in South Carolina in 1917.

[6]*Ibid.*, March 5, 1931.

[7]*Ibid.*, May 28, 1920.

[8]George Soule, *Prosperity Decade: From War to Depression, 1917-1929*, New York, 1947, p. 96.

[9]New York *Times*, October 9, 1920; October 11, 1920; October 15, 1920.

What response to the agricultural crisis of 1920 could be expected from the senior senator from South Carolina, Ellison Durant Smith? A few clues to the answer to this query are revealed in the senator's background.

Born on a substantial family farm in Lee County in 1864, the young Smith spent his childhood in neither poverty nor wealth. He attended schools in Lynchburg and Charleston before matriculating at South Carolina College in 1885. After a poor year he was "obliged to rusticate at Wofford" where he did well in debate, science, literature, and oratory and received the A.B. degree in 1889.[10] In the 1890's Smith was a planter interested in politics, public schools, prohibition, and private colleges. As a member of the South Carolina House of Representatives, 1897-1900, Smith was generally considered anti-Tillman because of his attacks on the dispensary and the public colleges.

As an unsuccessful candidate for the United States House of Representatives in 1901, Smith had favored the Nicaraguan Canal, rural free delivery, and federal support of roads, swamp drainage, and irrigation but opposed ship subsidies, imperialism, trusts, and the tariff. At one stump meeting he stated that the big issue was "the question between capital and labor" and he was on labor's side.[11] As an active participant and organizer in farmer organizations in South Carolina and throughout the Southeast from the late 1890's until 1907, Smith had attacked the cotton exchanges and had urged cooperative ventures in crop reduction, warehousing, and direct sales to textile mills.[12] His activities with these organizations earned him the nicknames "Gatlin Gun," "Carolina Smith," and "Cotton Ed."[13]

Elected to the United States Senate in 1908, Smith served continuously until his death in 1944. Despite the accuracy of the newspaper commentary after his maiden speech in the Senate—"His mid-

[10]John A. Rice, *I Came Out of the Eighteenth Century*, New York, 1942, p. 70; *Congressional Directory* 61st Cong., 2nd sess., p. 115; Martha Nelle Bouknight, "The Senatorial Campaigns of Ellison Durant ('Cotton Ed') Smith of South Carolina," unpublished Master's thesis, Florida State University, 1961, pp. 5-6.

[11]Sumter *Herald*, August 16, 1901; August 23, 1901; August 30, 1901; September 6, 1901.

[12]Selden K. Smith, "Ellison Durant Smith: A Southern Progressive, 1909-1929," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of South Carolina, 1970, pp. 28-37.

[13]"Gatlin Gun" and "Carolina Smith" were two early nicknames, but it was the third, "Cotton Ed," coined by a New Orleans newspaper, that was to stick with Smith the rest of his life. He loved it. New York *Times*, November 18, 1944.

d:· name is Durant, and that's what he do"[14]—the senator's voting record indicated consistent support for most of the legislative program of the national progressives. When downward revision of the tariff was not possible, he endorsed reciprocity as a step in the right direction. He supported national banking and credit reforms, federal aid for agriculture and road construction, and federal regulation through the Clayton Anti-trust Act, the federal trade commission, and the Adamson Act. Smith seconded Wilson's nomination in 1912 and generally supported the Democratic President except on the issue of immigration. He introduced the Muscle Shoals legislation for the construction of nitrate plants and supported the government takeover of the railroads and telegraph lines during World War I. He helped obtain Chilean nitrates for farmers with government aid and successfully opposed wartime price controls for cotton.

Smith's credentials as a progressive were valid but incomplete. He gave little attention to matters of social conscience such as unemployment, slums, and discrimination. The humanitarian urge which made "do-gooders" of many progressives was not in evidence. He opposed child labor legislation, praising the millowners while arguing that the workers did not want the legislation. He protested woman suffrage and tarbrushed the nineteenth amendment with talk of the "alien population amongst us." The women of South Carolina did not favor it, he said, for they, in his words, "refused to be stampeded by a few hysterical propagandists or propagooses." Showing no social or economic concern for the unhappy lot of black Americans, Smith accepted the assumptions of racial prejudice which permeated his society.[15] However, of all the issues which confronted this politician, none was dearer than the problems of agriculture.

As the commodity prices dropped in the fall of 1920, the farmers and their elected representatives began to apply pressure in Washington. Because the President was ill this farm lobby met with the cabinet and arranged a meeting with the Federal Reserve Board as well. "Cotton Ed" forewarned the board at a public meeting the day before their appointment. He called for an economic boycott of agricultural commodities throughout the nation to force the federal reserve to relax its credit policies. "Let us say to the Federal Board that 40 cent cotton and $3.00 wheat are our prices and if we don't

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[14]Beverly Smith, "F.D.R., Here I Come," *American Magazine*, January, 1939, p. 146.

[15]Smith, "Ellison Durant Smith," pp. 279-81.

get them we will try to get those in office who will loosen up. . . ."[16]

Encouraged by shouts of approval at this October 12 meeting, Smith struck hard at the speculators and government bankers. "If forty cent cotton and three dollar wheat are speculative, who says so . . . . the man who sweats in the field or the man who sits down at home and manipulates them? Who in America has been given the power to fix the price of anything? I am tired of running around asking appointed creatures to interpret the Federal Reserve law for me."[17] The senator felt that the board should simply discount the farmers' paper, pass on the paper's eligibility, and not concern itself with prices.

Smith had no patience with those who urged caution. "So far as some people coming here and saying 'the Government will frown on that'—for God's sakes! haven't we got a government and isn't that government the democracy of the people themselves?" After listening to "Cotton Ed" and another speaker who described the federal reserve as an "octopus bent on robbing the people," a man from Cave Springs, Georgia exclaimed, "My God! Night riders in Georgia and day riders in Washington!"[18]

At a farmers conference with treasury secretary David F. Houston on October 14, Smith suggested the revival of the war finance corporation in order to provide cotton credits to Austria and Germany. That wartime agency had the authority to advance up to $1,000,000,000 until one year after the end of hostilities as proclaimed by the President. In response to the senator, Houston said, "Then you would lend money to Germany." Smith was unequivocal, "Yes, I would because you know that Germany must live and we must not starve."

Following the interruption for applause, Smith began to plead with Houston, the former secretary of agriculture:

> You, Mr. Secretary, are the only one who can speak the words to liberate us. . . . God help you if you don't do it. We face ruin and it's monstrous and an official crime not to stop it. Talk of where we would get the money! Where did we get the $26,000,000,000 used to whip Germany to her knees? If

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[16]New York *Times*, October 13, 1920.
[17]*Ibid.*
[18]*Ibid.*

necessary, I would bond the country again as we did in the Victory and Liberty loans.[19]

J. S. Wannamaker of St. Matthews, president of the American Cotton Association, wanted the Congress to create a $1,000,000,000 revolving fund to aid producers and consumers in handling the commodities. In anger and sadness he cried, "God pity a nation that won't lend money to its people to aid agriculture."[20] The National Farmers' Council joined with a number of Southern bankers and cotton merchants and demanded that the reserve board lower its rediscount rate and set aside its regulations defining rediscountable agricultural paper. "Cotton Ed" lent his support to this proposition and stated that Congress could catch up with the necessary legislative authorization at the next session. At his meeting with the reserve board the senator had urged similar action, frankly admitting that the farmers were a special class who merited preferential treatment.[21]

The response from the administration and the federal reserve board gave the farmers no hope of aid. Although buffeted by severe criticism even within the cabinet, Houston clung to his belief that time alone and the natural forces that governed the marketplace would cure the crisis. The war finance board was not revived despite the pleas of the farmers and the recommendation of Eugene Meyer, Jr., the former president of that public corporation. Wilson apparently agreed with Houston. At a cabinet meeting during the crisis Wilson shut off debate on the subject with, "Let's talk about something more interesting. It is no use trying to reason with people into whose minds reason never entered."[22]

Houston was convinced that much of the public rhetoric was Southern political sham. In his memoirs, the secretary described a meeting with a delegation from the South concerning the cotton crisis of 1920. As he related the events, just prior to his meeting with the Southern group, several senators came into his office by another door and "told me . . . that they knew I could not do what the delegation was going to urge but that they had to appear to be sympathetic"

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[19]*Ibid.*, October 15, 1920.
[20]*Ibid.*
[21]*Ibid.*, October 13, 1920; October 15, 1920; October 16, 1920.
[22]David F. Houston, *Eight Years with Wilson's Cabinet, 1913 to 1920*, New York, 1926, II, 108-115.

and they expressed the hope that Houston would understand. The secretary understood but was not the least bit sympathetic.[23]

On October 16 the federal reserve board answered the farmers, denied any past contraction of credit and promised no expansion and ignored the demand that rediscount rates be lowered. The board acted on the assumption that the price decline in commodities was just an "unavoidable consequence" of the end of the great war.[24] The following week the American Bankers' Association meeting in Washington gave wholehearted endorsement to the administration and the federal reserve board. The president of the Atlanta National Bank declared that the time had passed for oratory and appeals to the government. Private bankers and farmers had to help themselves and do the job required and that task was not to hold cotton but to move cotton. The bankers had no intention of helping the farmer corner the market in commodities.[25]

In an article in the New York *Times* which appeared under his own by-line in late October, "Cotton Ed" discussed the farm crisis. A farm strike was inevitable if relief was not granted. The strike as defined by Smith was simply a mass movement of farmers leaving the land; all agricultural activity would not cease but disastrous cuts in production would occur. Some would continue to plant, clinging to the hope of better days; "a few others will keep on in a dull listless sort of fashion, through sheer force of habit until they go down under the loss." The senator felt that few people fully comprehended the impact of this mass migration to the city. The farmer, like those in other endeavors, was beset by the high cost of living, not the cost of high living. The situation demanded not a greater supply of money but a better distribution of money to benefit the average man. It had been "fondly thought that the Federal Reserve Board would normally and effectually bring about this distribution. . . ." If the

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[23]*Ibid.*, pp. 103-105. On October 23, 1920, Houston complained to W. W. Ball of "the ignorance and insolence of such crazy people as Wannamaker and such demagogues as E. D. Smith in the South, and such absolutely benighted and backward minds as Harding and the group of reactionaries who control him." Houston was convinced that Wannamaker and Smith were unrepresentative of the great mass of Southern people and he likewise rejected their proposals for solution. Houston's low opinion of the senator was revealed in the same letter. "Of course I have known E. D. Smith for 35 years. I knew him in college [South Carolina College], as you did. I regarded him as a boob then, and he has lost ground in 35 years." D. F. Houston to W. W. Ball, October 23, 1920, Duke University Library, W. W. Ball Papers.

[24]New York *Times*, October 17, 1920

[25]*Ibid.*, October 20, 1920; October 21, 1920; October 22, 1920.

nation was to avoid "serious trouble," the federal reserve system or "some other agency" must effect a more equitable distribution.

The senator made clear in his article that the farmers who gathered in Washington and talked of reducing acreage by one-half or one-third were "desperate" men. "Cotton Ed" left no doubt as to the source from which farm relief was expected. "To whom would they naturally turn? The answer is to their government. The manufacturer has back of him powerful financial affiliations. The farmer has only himself and his government."[26]

Throughout the depressing episode of the farm crisis of 1920, Senator Smith's behavior was quite consistent with his earlier performance. He was an active propagandist, sensitive to the economic problems of those he represented, but he did not command the forces required to effect relief. In spite of his outbursts of radicalism, Smith struck no terror in conservative hearts. He was capable of rising to rhetorical heights in his expression of sympathy for the white masses.[27] His threats were indulged or cast asides as the exaggerations of a politician who would not or could not deliver. Although ineffective in the 1920 crisis, the issues he recognized were basic to the American farm problem—special credits, foreign markets, crop reduction, and federal assistance. For the politician who had helped fashion the paternalistic state for agriculture, it was logical to turn to that institution in time of crisis. Disappointment came when that government proved unresponsive to genuine need. The senator clung to no doctrinaire positions of states rights or laissez faire economics. His response to the depression of 1920 was that of a demagogic politician motivated by practical politics.

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[26] *Ibid.*, October 24, 1920.

[27] An example of this rhetoric was delivered in 1913 during debate over cotton futures legislation: "We sit here in better circumstances and do not hear the cry of poverty nor feel the humility of its attendant evils. We are optimistic, and we are forgetful of our more unfortunate fellows. These are the lines that illustrate that:

> The toad beneath the harrow knows
> Exactly where each tooth point goes.
> The butterfly upon the road
> Preaches contentment to that toad."

Congressional Record, 62 Cong., 3 Sess., 4001 (February 26, 1913). Smith must have liked the verse. During the Muscle Shoals debates in 1926 he repeated it for Senator Heflin's benefit and added, "But the toad is getting darned tired of the butterfly preaching contentment to him. (Laughter)" *Congressional Record*, 69 Cong., 1 Sess., 4837 (March 2, 1926).

EXECUTIVE POWERS AND FOREIGN RELATIONS: THE NEUTRALITY ACTS REVISITED

JAMIE W. MOORE

Almost uniformly, and incorrectly I believe, studies of America's diplomatic activities during the mid-1930's place their strongest emphasis upon the domestic bases of foreign policy.[1] To be sure, the problem of ending the greatest depression in the nation's history commanded the attention of the nation's leaders. The American people looked back upon the horrors of a great war—already named World War I—and at the insoluble postwar conflicts which denied to them the peaceful and stable world they had been promised, and they reacted by showing apathy and indifference to foreign affairs and opposition to overseas political entanglements. No longer interested in crusades to make the world safe for democracy, Americans were more than willing to settle down in a world safe enough for the United States. But the case has been overstated. During these depression years Congress enacted and twice modified a neutrality law interpreted then and later as placing limits upon the President's authority. Upon this premise of curtailed powers is erected the thesis that the popular commitment to isolation and neutrality directed an unwilling administration to accept policies totally unsuitable for meeting the challenges of aggressor states. The neutrality acts affected the course of American foreign relations, but not in the obstructive manner so often described. Instead, this legislation fell well within the consensus of administration thinking; Franklin D. Roosevelt did not just accept the statutes, he embraced them. The public demands and Congressional pressures for action served mainly to turn consensus into conviction.

The agreement upon policy stemmed from the views of a President interested and actively engaged in foreign affairs and rested

[1]Not unnaturally, but for far too long, the analysis of American foreign policy from 1933 onward has been entrusted to historians interested in exploring the origins of the Second World War and America's involvement in it. Whether explaining, castigating, or defending what happened, the authors consistently frame the problem in terms of the 1939-1941 struggle between isolationists and interventionists. To the resulting distortion caused by the historian's perspective must be added a general willingness to accept as fact what appears obvious on the surface, that the conduct of foreign affairs was a sideshow to the New Deal's main event of domestic reform. For three exceptions, two area studies and one work contemporary with the first administration, which describe foreign policy in terms of a response to international conditions, see Dorothy Borg, *The United States and the Far Eastern Crisis of 1933-1938*, Cambridge 1964; Bryce Wood, *The Making of the Good Neighbor Policy*, New York 1961; and Ernest K. Lindley, *Half Way With Roosevelt* New York 1936.

upon the recommendations of advisors who shared and concurred in his decisions. The suggestion that during his first term Roosevelt neglected foreign policy out of his concern or preoccupation with the domestic economic crisis is without adequate foundation. Roosevelt had strong convictions, obtained good advice from many sources, used it in reaching his conclusions, and saw his policies translated into action, although he seldom proceeded rapidly or decisively and hated to resolve conflicts.[2] Except for the frequently expressed generalized

[2]For examples illustrating Roosevelt's penchant for becoming involved in foreign affairs, including his use of private channels of communication and devices for control, see Edgar M. Nixon, ed., *Franklin D. Roosevelt and Foreign Affairs*, 3 Vols., Cambridge 1969, I, 49, 187-88, 264-66, 273-79, II, 454-55, III, 6; Roosevelt to S.T.E. [Stephen T. Early], Sept. 20, 1934; William E. Dodd to Roosevelt, July 30 1933, Roosevelt MSS, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library (cited hereafter FDRL), OF 523 (Official Files): Dodd; Robert Bingham to Roosevelt, Nov. 4, 1934, May 26, 1935, Roosevelt MSS, PPF 716 (President's Personal Files); Roosevelt to Jessie I. Straus, May 9, 1935, Roosevelt MSS, PSF (President's Secretary's Files): Straus; Roosevelt to Cordell Hull, April 23, 1935, Hull MSS, Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress (cited hereafter LC), box 51; Elliott Roosevelt, Ed., *F.D.R.: His Personal Letters 1928-1945*, New York, 1950, I, 508. The question of who gave Roosevelt advice is easily answered, everybody did. Finding out who he listened to at any one time can turn into an exercise in futility, but for his early years the comments of the Head of the State Department's Far Eastern Division, Stanley K. Hornbeck, hold up. According to Hornbeck," [W]hen he [Roosevelt] wanted real facts and well considered opinions, he leaned heavily upon Hull and the staff work upon which Hull in turn relied." It was true "that there was administrative confusion all the way from 1933 to 1944, but the confusion during that decade was far less than that which subsequently prevailed for several years." Hornbeck to George E. Sokolsky, Feb. 16, 1962 Hornbeck MSS, Hoover Institute of War, Revolution, and Peace, Archives, box 124. Among the President's convictions were an almost populist distrust of international bankers and a distaste for entering into contractural alliances with other governments. Roosevelt to Col. Edward M. House, Nov. 21, 1933, House MSS, Sterling Library, Yale University (cited hereafter SL), Correspondence file; Nixon, *Roosevelt*, I, 268-69, 596, II, 184-85; Journal entry, Sept. 28, 1934, William Phillips MSS, The Houghton Library of Harvard University (cited hereafter HL); Moffat to Davis, July 2, 1934, Davis MSS, LC, box 12, and the items in Vol. III of Frank Freidel's work noted below. Roosevelt exhibited strong leanings toward idealistic and simplistic solutions to complex problems. He favored an easy answer of having nations sign a disarmament pact doing away with all weapons of war except what a soldier could carry on his back. Mild versions of this appeared at times in his public statements. Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59, National Archives (cited hereafter RDS), 500-A15A4/2537 and 500-A15A4/2600 1/3; Memorandum of April 28, 1934, Davis MSS, Box 9; Samuel I. Rosenman, compiler, *The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt*, New York, 1938, II, 14, 185-88, 544-49. Nations which refused to sign, he felt, might be coerced by an embargo or blockade. Diary entry, March 18, 1935, The Diaries of Henry Morgenthau Jr., Book IV, p. 12, FDRL. Roosevelt spoke about how international problems might be resolved if national leaders could get together, discuss, and perhaps compose their differences. Roosevelt to Davis, Aug. 21, 1933, Davis MSS, box 51; Roosevelt to Dodd, Sept. 13, 1933 and Aug. 25, 1934, Roosevelt MSS, OF 523 and PPF 1043. The President's feelings toward individual nations, which he tended to stereotype, are noted as appropriate points in the text. The evolution and maturation of Roosevelt's ideas on foreign affairs are discussed in detail in a meticulous and worthy biography. See Frank Freidel, *Franklin D. Roosevelt*, 3 Vols., Boston, 1952, 1954, 1956, I, 226-27, 232, 260, 288, 318-19, 335-36, II, 17-18, 52-54, 81-82, 87, 122-37, 236, 240-41, III, 245-54, 357.

platitudes, the President's specific aims were never brought together in one single document. But the thrust of his major decisions, particularly on the basic question of collective security and the regional ones of European and Far Eastern relations, clearly show a reasoned and realistic assessment of America's role in world affairs.

Roosevelt had an internationalist outlook, believed in cooperation between nations, and expressed his sympathy toward policies that would condition a peaceful settlement of disputes. But he had in mind a particular level of American participation in any collective endeavor. His concern over the possibility of a major war breaking out led him, on several occasions, to urge European governments to get together and sign an agreement restricting land armaments. Without large quantities of modern weapons on hand, he reasoned, nations would have to resolve their differences peacefully. To make this suggestion more palatable to those national leaders who felt signing such a pact would jeopardize their security, he authorized Special Ambassador Norman H. Davis to state at the Geneva Disarmament Conference that in the event of a threat to world peace the United States was prepared to confer with other governments and, on the basis of its independent judgment, to refrain from taking any action which would tend to defeat the collective effort to restrain aggression. What Roosevelt had approved sounded like an internationalist statement bottomed on a doctrine of collective security, but it was not. His proposal was contingent upon a general disarmament agreement satisfactory to the United States being signed, and, at the time Davis spoke, the chances of reaching an accord no longer existed. In essence, Roosevelt had advanced a negative statement involving no American participation in collective or punitive action taken against violators of the peace. His declaration was a decision not to prevent other nations from applying the principles of collective security, but his policy never involved coming to the aid of the victims of aggression.[3]

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[3]In response to an urgent request from Davis for instructions, the State Department established the American position on collective security which Roosevelt then approved. For the background see Moffat to Phillips, April 19, 1933, Roosevelt MSS, PSF: Disarmament Conference; Conversation between Hull and Japanese Ambassador, May 18, 1933, Hull MSS, folder 228; RDS, 500.A15A4 General Committee/384; U.S., Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1933*, I, 154-58. (Volumes in this series are cited hereafter FRUS.) For the convoluted arguments which supported the announcement see Nixon, *Roosevelt*, I, 184, 190-94, 374-76, 419-22, 623-25, II, 259-61; RDS 500.A15A4/1928; Rosenman, *Papers*, III, 3-14. Roosevelt's thinking on coercing nations which did not sign a non-aggression pact (cited in n. 2, above) followed the same reasoning as the Geneva statement. American participation would be limited to seeing that no Americans violated the embargo or blockade.

In matters affecting what Roosevelt considered a vital American interests, however, he replaced vague generalities with positive statements. In 1934, after the Japanese government had made known its complete dissatisfaction with the Washington and London treaties which denied them across the board parity in naval arms, the British Foreign Office invited American and Japanese representatives to London for a series of private discussions. The British hoped to find some formula which would keep Japan within the framework of an international agreement. If necessary, they were ready to at least consider compromising the 10-10-7 ratio principle. From the beginning, Roosevelt denied Japan's assertion of the right to build and maintain a navy equal in size to the American fleet. When it seemed to him that the British might be thinking about a major accommodation, possibly including a revival of the old Anglo-Japanese alliance, the President angrily issued instructions to his delegation to take a firm stand. He hoped American steadfastness would convince the Japanese to drop their demands, but his real target was Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald whom he intended to impress with the simple fact that Britain had no choice but to line up with the United States. Roosevelt was willing to risk a rupture of Anglo-American friendship to get this point across.[4]

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[4]Rivalry in fleet strength had been a disturbing feature in Anglo-American relations after World War I. While neither government envisioned any possibility of a clash, the two naval establishments, each working on the "worst case" theory of preparedness, were determined that any accommodation did not compromise security. See Harold and Margaret Sprout, *Toward A New Order of Sea Power*, Princeton, 1940, pp. 17, 19, 21-22, 37-38, 75, 123, 278-92, and Stephen Roskill, *The Period of Anglo-American Antagonism 1919-1929*, Vol. I, *Naval Policy Between the Wars*, London, 1968, pp. 20-24, 81-83, 222-23. In testimony before a Congressional committee in 1921 Roosevelt declared that the United States needed the largest navy in the world, a statement which went further than the then existing policy of having a navy second to none. Quoted in George T. Davis, *A Navy Second to None*, New York, 1940, p. 357, f.n. American-British differences were grudgingly resolved in the agreements reached at Washington in 1922 and London in 1930. These treaties assumed that the Pacific naval powers would operate within the *status quo*, neither extending their ambitions nor feeling their security menaced by other powers. Nevertheless, Roosevelt never really abandoned his principle of American security first. In 1933, when he announced a program of naval building, he primarily intended to aid national defense. Pumping federal money into projects to aid domestic recovery through providing employment in the shipyards, he felt, was an important, but secondary consideration. See Nixon, *Roosevelt*, I, 370, and Davis, *Navy*, pp. 301-06. The clash of interests at the naval conferences which resulted in concluding the best possible arrangements, even if they didn't hold up in the 1930's, is covered from all sides in Akira Iriye, *After Imperialism: The Search for a New Order in the Far East 1921-1931*, New York, 1969; Thomas H. Buckley, *The United States and the Washington Conference 1921-1922*, Knoxville, 1970; Raymond G. O'Connor, *Perilous Equilibrum, The United States and the London Naval Conference of 1930*, Lawrence, 1962. In the thirties, each government pursued its own policy of naval interest. Great Britain, with bases around the world and facing increases in naval strength by the governments of Italy, France, and Germany, wanted agree-

The important aspects of the early Rooseveltian diplomacy centered around relations with Great Britain. On the surface, the two nations had everything in common. Both wanted peace, security, increased trade, freedom from aggression, improvement in the position of their national economies, and a world which ran according to the tenets of international law. Neither wished for additional spheres of influence or overseas commitments, an arms race, or aggressive upsets of the world order. But strong differences of opinion divided the Atlantic democracies on financial, monetary and tariff matters, on the advisability of implementing an international arms agreement,

ments limiting the size of ships and allowing Britain more of them. The United States, with two large oceans and few forward bases, wanted large ships for itself and a treaty which severely limited the number of vessels allowed to each nation. Japan wanted whatever the United States and Britain had. See Admiral William V. Pratt, "The Setting for the 1935 Naval Conference;" Sir Herbert W. Richmond, "Naval Problems of 1935, A British View;" and Admiral Kichisaburo Nomura, "Japan's Demand for Naval Equality," *Foreign Affairs*, XII (July, 1934), 541-52; XIII (October, 1934), 45-58; XIII (January, 1935), 196-203. The 1934 conversations, viewed as a preliminary meeting before the general naval conference everyone expected would take place in 1935, began with an exchange of correspondence between Stimson and MacDonald in 1933. The British, hoping to convince the United States to abandon construction of 10,000 ton cruisers which would upset Britain's program if the larger ships became a naval standard, widened the subject of the talks to include all naval matters. Records of the British Foreign Office, Public Records Office, London, W 82/82/98, F.O. 371/18535 (cited hereafter RBFO). During the talks, conducted on an Anglo-American, Anglo-Japanese, and American-Japanese basis, the three governments found themselves hopelessly at odds. Anglo-American relations suffered when the American program of limiting armaments clashed with the British request for qualitative and quantitative adjustments. The disagreements, as seen from the American side, may be traced in *FRUS 1934*, I, a series of items, pp. 222-286; Nixon, *Roosevelt*, II, 16-18, 18-19, 160-61, 161-62; Roosevelt MSS, PSF: London Naval Conf., file folder 1; Entries for March 16, April 2, May 8-9, and Oct. 19, Jay Pierrepont Moffat MSS, HL; Hornbeck MSS, box 129, Journal entry of June 26, 1934, Phillips MSS. The American dislike of the British proposals quickly turned into distrust of British motives. Despite efforts within the American delegation at London to convince Washington the situation was not as bad as it appeared, by summer both Hull and Roosevelt had heard enough rumors to become highly suspicious. In early September the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs informed Grew that Japan intended to withdraw from the naval agreements. The American leadership, faced with what they read as British trend toward Japan and away from the United States, as reflected in Ambassador Lindsay's statement that Britain was absorbed in Europe and did not want to "play ball" with the United States, began to issue warnings. Roosevelt pointedly mentioned that if Britain was even suspected of preferring Japan to the United States, in the interest of American security he would approach the Canadian, Australian, New Zealand, and South African peoples in a definite effort to make these dominions understand that their security was linked to the United States. See *FRUS 1934*, I, 296-97, 299-03, 303-04, 309-10; Nixon, *Roosevelt*, II, 250-54, 263-64; *FRUS Japan 1931-1941*, I, 253-54; Entries of July 3-4, Sept. 18, 21, 26, Oct. 3, Moffat MSS; Hull to Roosevelt, Sept. 18, 1934, PSF: State Dept., Phillips to Roosevelt, Nov. 9, 1934, PSF: London Naval Conf., Roosevelt MSS; Journal entry for Oct. 15, Phillips MSS. The immediate tensions eased when on November 23 and December 4 MacDonald agreed that Britain needed the United States, wanted Anglo-American cooperation above all else, and was not interested in allowing Japan to attain parity. *FRUS 1934*, I, 368-74, 381-88. But Roosevelt did not feel that the difficulties had been overcome, and the suspicions reemerged in 1935.

and, most importantly, on the proper basis for Anglo-American cooperation. Although both governments recognized the need to continue their friendship and seek areas where cooperative policies could be developed, each wanted to set the terms upon which the other was to cooperate. The British, challenged directly by Germany and unable alone to protect their Far Eastern interests, had the greater burden. To Roosevelt, it appeared the British were inclined to find their way out of the dilemma through policies of negotiation, which expended the assets of other nations, by mollification of the dictators, and from security guarantees obtained where ever they could find them. Believing the British were trying to cajol or blackmail him into some type of alliance to protect British interests, he reacted by determining to wait out the period of flirtation with potential aggressors and look forward to a time when the aims of the two nations would be more compatible.[5]

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[5]According to a recent study of the fundamentals upon which the British government based its policy, Britain's aims were to reestablish in Europe an acceptable balance of power granting to each nation security from aggression and to create an opportunity for nations to rebuild their depression shattered economics. The British had concluded that the European issues of a monetary crisis, the depression, reparations, war debts, and disarmament, were part of an interlocked series, so entwined that unless a solution could be found for all, individual problems were insoluble. The quest for a method of ending the European dilemma meant that Far Eastern matters had to be given a lower priority. Feeling they would be among the first on the firing line in case of aggression in Europe, committed to an enthusiastic support of the League of Nations, incapable of protecting their interests in Asia, and unwilling to risk British or the League's prestige in any futile attempts to make Japan disgorge Manchuria, the government tread the thin line of negotiation policies designed to retain Chinese goodwill, to avoid antagonizing Japan, and to preserve American friendship. But some elements in Britain, always in a minority and never influential in policy making, supported a real Anglo-Japanese accommodation. Christopher Thorne, "The Shanghai Crisis of 1932: The Basis of British Policy," *American Historical Review*, LXXV (October, 1970), 1616-39. The major problem dominating British foreign policy, said Foreign Secretary Sir John Simon, lay in the dilemma of reconciling France's demand for security with Germany's insistence on equal rights. But although Britain Europe-first policy developed naturally, Britain could not overlook the long term challenge posed by Japan. Consequently, dependent upon American good will, upon Japanese good will, and upon the good will of China in order to maintain a presence in Asia, the British tried to play the role of an interested but honest broker. To be successful, Britain needed both independence and allies. Sir Robert Vansittert, Permanent Under Secretary of State, and other foreign office officials believed the United States was about to enter a period of isolationism and nationalism and would practice cooperation only to the extent of thrusting Britain forward to advance American interests. They recommended a British policy of *realpolitik*. Robert Vansittart, *The Mist Procession*, London, 1958, pp. 385-529; RBFO, F 2761/33/10, A 9235/252/45, A 9235/252/45, F 7818/5189/61, F 7818/5189/61, F 5189/5189/61. The British view of the 1934 preliminary naval conversations, now accessible but as yet unpublished in *Documents on British Foreign Policy*, may be traced in RBFO, W 82/82/89, W 2243/82/98, W 4399/82/98, F.O. 371/18535; A 5852/1939/45, A 5853/1938/45, F.O. 371/17599; A 5859/1939/45, F.O. 371/1934; A 8641/1938/45; A 8705/1938/45, F.O. 371/17600; A 9264/1938/45, F.O. 17601; A 7186/1928/45, F.O. 371/17599; A 9274/1938/45, F.O. 371/17601; A 6225/428/45, F.O. 371/

Historians writing during and after the tragedy of the Second World War have described American foreign policy as being selfish, narrow, and short sighted, and have blamed the American people for being unwilling to meet their international responsibilities. But policy was not being made by national referendum, and, as the representatives of the people, Roosevelt and his advisors did not consider it unreasonable to be wary of the motive of foreign governments. They noted with interest that Britain wanted an understanding or some commitment from the United States, yet was denying to France the same promises of support. American diplomats and private correspondents abroad accurately identified the real threat of aggression in Europe, but the unwillingness of European nations, particularly Britain, to agree on a common policy to meet the danger reinforced Roosevelt's conviction there was no useful or constructive step he could take which would aid in securing world peace.[6]

17598. In the naval talks the British intended not to upset the ratio formulas but to find some room within them for adjustments. Although unsuccessful in persuading the American government to accept this view, they did succeed in finally getting an understanding from the United States that Britain could fulfill its needs for additional small cruisers. The accommodation sought with Japan was never of the caliber which really threatened any American interest, as the British kept trying to make clear.

[6]A mild Anglophobia, a belief in the efficacy of isolationism, and an extreme nationalism characterized some studies in the Navy and State Departments at this time. For examples see Claude A. Swanson to Roosevelt, Nov. 19, 1934, Roosevelt MSS, PSF: London Naval Conf.; RDS, 500.A15a5/40 1/2 and 500. A15a5/41; *FRUS 1934*, I, 230-32. Roosevelt's conviction as to the inadvisability of concluding any political agreement was strengthened by recurrent rumors that the British and Japanese governments were on the verge of reaching an understanding or actually making an alliance of some sort. Roosevelt was never convinced these reports were accurate, but neither did he disbelieve them. Diary entries of July 15 and 31, 1934, Joseph C. Grew MSS, HL; Memoranda and copies of dispatches, Hornbeck MSS, boxes 143 and 159; Diary entries of Aug. 21 and 22, 1934, Moffat MSS; Journal entries of Aug. 21 and Sept. 24, 1934, Phillips MSS. Grew was instructed to try and ascertain the truth behind the rumors. After investigation, he reported they probably were manufactured as a trial balloon by the Japanese Foreign Minister. Conversations: 1932-1936, pp. 116, 118, 123, 127, 136, 158, 160, Grew MSS. A British investigation, launched at the same time, turned up evidence the rumors had been started by a Soviet intelligence agency to test and see if an Anglo-Japanese entente was a possibility. RBFO, F 2614/376/23, F.O. 371/19357. In 1935 Roosevelt confided to Henry Morgenthau Jr. that the signing of the Anglo-German Naval Agreement was perhaps a successful step by Britain to secure their European interests through an accommodation with the Hitler government, potentially the continent's strongest land power. The President said this was entirely in keeping with the suspected British design of securing their Far Eastern interests by reaching an agreement with Japan. Entry of July 10, 1935, Morgenthau Diaries, Book VIII. This portion of the Morgenthau Diaries, closed until June 25, 1969, was open by the staff at the FDRL at the request of this author. C.f. Roosevelt's suspicions about the aims behind the South American activities of friendly European governments as recorded in the entry of Jan. 17, 1936, Harold L. Ickes, *The First Thousand Days, 1933-1936*, Vol. I, *The Secret Diary of Harold L. Ickes*, New York, 1954, p. 514. As in the case of the Japanese affair, British policy at the time of the naval agreement with Germany, while startling and upsetting, was

The only war danger facing the United States when Roosevelt took office, and that a remote and hypothetical possibility, concerned a clash with Japan. While still President-Elect, Roosevelt had endorsed Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson's doctrine of non-recognition of territorial gains resulting from the unlawful use of military force. Agreeing implicitly with Stimson that the occupation of Manchuria might be the first step leading to a Japanese-dominated Asian order, probably harmful to American national interest, the President too denied that any legitimate basis for Japan's action existed and declared the principles of the Open Door to be the keystone of his Far Eastern policy. But all the rhetoric only thinly obscured the Chief Executive's private assessment that the United States had nothing to gain by challenging Japan. The Japanese government's unquestioned military supremacy in the Western Pacific and announced militancy dictated a pragmatic American response of retrenchment, consolidation, and withdrawal from hazardous, speculative, and adventurous positions, and to this Roosevelt gave his assent. Aware of Japan's dominate position in the Far East, he accepted the conclusion of his State Department advisors that the United States was a Pacific, not an Asian power. Toward Japan, the American government acted passively, spoke softly, and carried no big stick. By 1934, both nations had come to a mutual realization that while they espoused conflicting doctrines, for the time being there were no points of actual confrontation.[7]

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not predicated upon any intention of giving Germany a free hand in Europe in return for non-interference with British policy. See RBFO, C 3943/55/18, F.O. 371/18840.

[7]The possibility of war with Japan was discussed at Roosevelt's second cabinet meeting. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., "Franklin D. Roosevelt and Foreign Affairs: Review," New York *Times*, July 6, 1969, Book Review Section. The evolution of the Stimson Doctrine is treated in detail in Robert H. Ferrell, *American Diplomacy in the Great Depression*, New Haven, 1957, pp. 151-193. Herbert Feis, *1933: Characters in Crisis*, Boston, 1966, pp. 29-32, 48-61, patiently traces the development of liaison between the outgoing and incoming administratons and treats Roosevelt's acceptance of Stimson's policy in depth. According to Stimson, Roosevelt thoroughly approved of the Hoover administration's foreign policy, said China would succeed in resisting Japan's encroachment, and felt the American fleet should remain on duty in Hawaii. (He sent it to the Atlantic for maneuvers in 1934). Diary entries of Jan. 9, 13, 17, 1933, Stimson MSS, SL. The administration's repeated declarations as to the need to maintain a lawful international order free from aggression are too numerous to mention. The early advice Roosevelt received was most cautionary. Roosevelt MSS, Hornbeck to Hull, May 3, 1933 and Phillips to Roosevelt, May 9, 1933, (both quickly forwarded to the White House). PSF: China 1933-1936, box 3. Dorothy Borg, *Far Eastern Crisis*, pp. 35-36, 519-27 demonstrates in detail that the determining factor in formulating American policy was the desire to avoid friction with Japan. Grew's warnings on Japan's strength, were based on fact plus acute observation. Roosevelt MSS, Naval Intelligence Summary, Dec. 12, 1933, PSF: Navy Department;

Under the circumstances, the President had only limited alternatives. Unwilling to either withdraw completely from the Far East or to make the unthinkable choice of cooperating in the Japanese effort to establish hegemony over China, and not inclined to confront the Nippon Empire aggressively, he simply followed the obvious course of watching, waiting, and hoping for better days ahead. The policy, really little more than the continuation of what Stimson had begun plus the old American dream that disorganized China might turn itself into a viable sovereign nation, was criticized by Americans who suggested their government take some action to improve Japanese-American relations. A number of serious policy reviews left the administration right back where it started. The passive containment of Japan, originally formulated because nothing better could be found, was continued for much the same reason. It maintained a vague moral commitment without leading the United States into dangerous adventures.[8]

Problems summary, n.d., PSF: Japan, 1933. For Grew's comments and the assessments of the Far Eastern experts which reached the White House see Hull to Roosevelt, Nov. 1, 1934, PSF: Cordell Hull, 1933-37; *FRUS 1935*, III, 821-29, 829-37, 842-43. The American low profile was much in evidence during the Amau affair when the Japanese Chief of Information and Intelligence, in April, 1934, announced Japan's Monroe Doctrine for Asia. The United States responded with a vaguely worded statement which only implied a repetition of the previous declaration that Japanese hegemony over China was contrary to American interests. The Japanese delightedly considered the reply more friendly in tone than Stimson's message of 1932. They should have. The guiding principle was that the message be "effectively declarative and at no point vulnerable to any rejoinder by the Japanese government or from any quarter. Hornbeck MSS, Autobiographical Manuscript, box 129. Items of interest relating to the Amau Doctrine are printed in *FRUS, Japan 1931-1941*, I 223-25, 225-27, 228-30, 230-31; Nixon, *Roosevelt*, II, 47-48, 53-71, 78-81, 88-90; and a series of items *FRUS 1934*, III, 113-153.

[8]In the mid-1930's American policy toward China differed substantially from the hopes of Americans for China's future. The former was grounded in two realities: The danger to American interests which would arise if support for China's government antagonized Japan, and a recognition that the United States had nothing vital at stake in that exploited, underdeveloped, and ill-governed nation. Interests were seldom precisely defined, but to the State Department, interests meant the right of Americans to carry on normal activities. The principle, not the business of trade and investment was the primary consideration. Moreover, American economic involvement in China was far more important to China than to the United States. The low degree of American activity, as distinguished from the lofty descriptions of the potential value of the China market, may be best understood by observing that between 1910 and 1935 no American economic mission even visited China. For trade and investment figures, see *FRUS 1935*, III, 359; George H. Blakeslee, "The Foreign Stake in China," *Foreign Affairs*, X (October, 1931), 81-91. The reference to trade missions came up in 1935 when a delegation from the National Foreign Trade Council, a private agency, visited China to inquire into the possibility of developing commercial relations. Hornbeck to Johnson, Jan. 16, 1935, Nelson T. Johnson MSS, LC. New Deal efforts to expand American trade through the Reconstruction Finance Corporation loans of 1933 was a short lived and unsuccessful experiment. See New York *Times*, June 5, 1933, p. 1, June 17, 1933, p. 4; Nixon, *Roosevelt*, I, 186-

Because conditions in Europe and Asia militated against the arguments put forward by advocates of a more internationalist policy, particularly in the Far East where the ability of China's government to survive was regarded as doubtful, the foundation of American diplomacy became a reasoned commitment to narrowly defined national interests.[9] No one could even conceive of any circumstances under which the United States would find itself at war with a European power without allies. No one seriously believed the Japanese would foolishly direct a thrust against American possessions, so long as the naval defenses were kept up. No one believed that if by some horrible miscalculation the United States were attacked other nations would come to America's aid. No one overlooked the obvious point that geography alone precluded any possibility that an outbreak of war would immediately threaten the Western Hemisphere. In sum, the United States could hope for, but did not have to rely upon, the support of other nations. Public opinion did not force isolationism upon the United States, neither did Congressional pressure dictate that the policy be continued, although both deepened the administration's commitment. By 1935 Roosevelt and his advisors had already concluded that in the absence of any universal desire for peace, the vital ques-

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87; and a series of items in box 99, Hornbeck MSS. Among the political realities recognized by the administration: A Chinese desire to drag foreigners with no territorial ambitions into the Sino-Japanese dispute, the probability that Japanese influence in Chinese affairs would continue to increase (and possibly at some future date force a capitulation by the Nationalists), and the clear evidence that the government of China exercised nominal authority, faced strong domestic political rivals, had not carried out the promised economic and social reforms, and in general grappled with conditions in which the disintegrating factors outweighed integrating factors. The two best overall treatments of American policy are Borg, *Far Eastern Crisis*, and Barbara Tuchmann, *Stillwell and the American Experience in China 1911-1945*, New York, 1970. For a review of the major works relating to the subject see Dorothy Borg, compiler, *Historians and American Far Eastern Policy*, New York, 1966. Specific descriptions, including the semi-annual reports on conditions in China, are available in *FRUS 1934*, III, 13-15, 217-20, 344-48; *FRUS 1935*, III, 7-9, 9-11, 13-15, 18-19, 44-45, 45-49, 59-60. These reports, and others, were pulled together in policy reviews forwarded to the White House. See Nixon, *Roosevelt*, I, 539-41, 567-70, 594-95, 610, 654-61, *FRUS 1934*, III, 189-93. Roosevelt held a sentimental view of China, considered himself an expert on the subject, and felt that the chief cause of China's difficulties was a continuation of colonial practices. But he did not act on these beliefs, except in the silver purchasing experiment which had as one feature the President's hope that it would contribute to an ending of control of China's financial institutions by foreign bankers. Nixon, *Roosevelt*, II, 305-07. C.f. Roosevelt's wartime statements to Stalin on the need to end imperialism in India as recounted by Gaddis Smith, *American Diplomacy During the Second World War, 1941-1945*, New York, 1965, pp. 81, 83-84, 89-90. During the Second World War Roosevelt believed, for a time, that China was a great power and by declaration he tried to make China one. In the period under discussion here he did not hold this opinion. Realism and not sentimentality marked this aspect of the New Deal foreign policy.

tion of national security could be considered only when the American government preserved freedom of action by remaining the sole judge of its own needs. Roosevelt never swerved from this principle.

Neutrality had been formalized in American policy long before Roosevelt took office. Beginning with George Washington's administration, when the need arose, Congress defined the government's position with regard to the pertinent international situation and, to insure the national policy would be carried out, provided for the means to regulate the conduct of citizens and alien residents. To make certain the government commanded and coordinated all phases of foreign policy, these acts granted to the chief executive additional powers, either previously undefined or denied him because their content touched domestic affairs. The statutes thus had an internal element, the controls, and an external component which presumed some foreign policy objective. The legislation had been a powerful and legitimate weapon in the American diplomatic arsenal. In execution, this neutrality had been malleable to the President's will.

By the early 1930's, however, "neutrality" had taken on a number of different meanings. The word had a legal definition, it described a "tradition" of staying out of other people's wars, and it was a euphemism for peace. To some, neutrality still meant the right of a non-belligerent to carry on trade in non-contraband materials, the American principle of freedom of the seas. As a slogan, neutrality was so powerful that advocates recommending a multitude of con-

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[9]The letters and dispatches received by Roosevelt personally and the State Department officially contained war warnings, pointed out the aggressive designs of Germany and Italy, and expressed a uniform dismay that the governments of Europe could not agree among themselves on how to meet this danger. See U.S., Department of State, *Peace and War: United States Foreign Policy 1931-1941*, Washington, 1943, pp 191-92, 211-214; Nixon *Roosevelt*, I, 172-76, II, 315-18, 401-04, 426-29, 437-38, 453-54, 460-64, 478-80, 486-88; *FRUS 1935*, I, 64-66, and a series of items pp. 176-309; *FRUS 1935*, II, a series of items pp. 299-337. The information left Roosevelt with a feeling he was helpless to do anything constructive. Entry of March 18, 1935, Morgenthau Diaries, Book IV, p. 112; Journal entry of March 22, 1935, Phillips MSS; Roosevelt to House, April 10, 1935, Correspondence file: FDR, House MSS; Roosevelt to Hull, March 9, 1935, *FRUS 1935*, I, 33; Roosevelt to Dodd, April 16, 1935, E. Roosevelt, *Letters*, I, 475; Roosevelt to Bingham, July 11, 1935, Nixon, *Roosevelt*, II, 553-54. For policy views concerning events in the Far East, see, in addition to the items cited in f.n. 8, above, Davis to Hull, Oct. 31, 1934, Davis MSS, box 12; Johnson to Hornbeck, Dec. 3, 1935 and Johnson to Stimson, Dec. 9, 1935; Johnson MSS; Borg, *Far Eastern Crisis*, p. 175; John Van Antwerp MacMurray, former Minister to China, to Hull, Nov. 1, 1935, RDS, 711.93/383, and related items in the MacMurray MSS, Firestone Library of Princeton University, box 147; Secretary of War George H. Dern to Roosevelt, Dec. 20, 1935, Roosevelt MSS, PSF: Dern, box 35.

flicting foreign policies all claimed to be representing the true faith.[10]

From the end of the First World War onward, exponents of neutrality legislation who supported the embargoing of war materials and commodities to cooperate with other governments in imposing economic sanctions, believed to be an effective means to deter aggression, clashed with opponents who contended that the use of sanctions was an unneutral act. Proposals authorizing the President to embargo selectively shipments of arms, munitions, and implements of war to belligerent governments were closely examined to see whether or not they would aid in furthering the cause of peace. It was over the interpretation of the ends of the proposed resolutions, world peace or non-belligerency for the United States, that the bitter debates took place. The smoke of the battle over the advisability of entrusting the President with discretionary embargo powers blinded the participants to the fact that they usually agreed in principle on the equally important question of who should control the nation's war production.[11]

Much of the ammunition used in the neutrality debates was drawn from the studies of the relationship among arms manufacturers, governments, and the origins of war. Acting on the hypothesis that the machinations of evil men in search of profit were a clear and present danger, neutrality advocates of all persuasions offered proposals to control the manufacture and trade in arms. Roosevelt shared this conviction that government regulation and supervision

[10]For the various laws which fall under the definition of neutrality legislation, see Francis Deak and Phillip C. Jessup, eds., *A Collection of Neutrality Laws, Regulations and Treaties of Various Countries*, 2 Vols., Washington, 1939, II, 1079-1262. By one definition, "neutrality, strictly speaking, consists in abstinence from any participation in a public, private, or civil war, and impartiality of conduct toward both parties thereto." U.S. v. The Three Friends, Fla. 166 U.S. 1. See 41 U.S. (Law Ed.) 897 and 914. For changes in definition, and the difficulties of applying neutrality after defining it, see Green Haywood Hackworth, *Digest of International Law*, 7 Vols., Washington, 1943, VII, 379-80; Marjorie M. Whiteman, *Digest of International Law*, 13 Vols., Dept. of State Pubn. 8354, Washington, 1968, XI, 139 ff.

[11]Robert Divine, *The Illusion of Neutrality*, Chicago, 1962, treats the domestic struggles over neutrality in great detail. For an outline of the basic arguments used by the participants, see Whitney H. Shepardson, "Nationalism and American Trade," and two articles by Charles Warren, "Troubles of a Neutral" and "Safeguards to Neutrality," *Foreign Affairs*, XII (April, 1934), 403-17; XII (April, 1934), 377-94; XIV (January, 1936), 199-215. Both favored allowing the President freedom of action. John Bassett Moore, "An Appeal to Reason," *Foreign Affairs* XI (July, 1933), 536 ff. argues the case for mandatory and restrictive legislation. These arguments were presented to a congressional committee in 1933. Subsequent hearings and debates tended to cover the same ground. See U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Exportation of Arms or Munitions of War, Hearings*, before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, on H.J. Res. 93, 73rd Cong., 1st sess., 1933, pp. 1-36.

was advisable. Deeply impressed with the spectacular revelations of Senator Gerald P. Nye's Special Munitions Investigating Committee, the President took the first initiative to place neutrality laws on the books.[12]

Beyond this, however, Roosevelt's thinking was not fixed. He indicated that he considered it desirable to have the power to embargo shipments of war materials to belligerents, but he did not call this a vital feature of neutrality legislation. He opposed war profiteering. He spoke favorably about measures which warned American citizens that if they traveled or conducted business in war zones or made loans they would do so without enjoying the automatic protection of the American government. But at no time did he gather all these loose ends together and place the power of his office behind a comprehensive neutrality program. State Department personnel made the major effort to get discretionary powers for the President enacted. Roosevelt agreed to this program, but not enthusiastically, and his consent came after pressure from the bloc in Congress grouped around Senator Nye indicated the administration might be faced

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[12]The exposes, the origins of the "merchants of death" thesis and the munitions investigation are covered in Wayne S. Cole, *Senator Gerald P. Nye and American Foreign Relations*, Minneapolis, 1962, and John E. Wiltz, *In Search of Peace, The Senate Munitions Inquiry, 1934-36*, Baton Rouge, 1963. For the information readily available to Roosevelt, his views on neutrality prior to suggesting to Nye on March 19, 1935, that his committee draft legislation, and the President's request for recommendations, see also Nixon, *Roosevelt*, II, 187-91, 222, 442-43; New York *Times*, Dec. 13, 1934, p. 1; Norman Davis to Henry Haskell, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Feb. 12, 1934, Davis MSS, box 2; Memorandum by Charles Warren, R. Walton Moore MSS, box 13, FDRL; Roosevelt to Hull, Dec. 8, 1934, with enclosures and R. Walton Moore, Confidential memorandum of Dec. 20, 1934, Roosevelt MSS, OF 178: Munitions, 1934. For Roosevelt's initiation of legislative action see New York *Times*, March 20, 1935, pp. 1, 9; March 31, p. 26; Nixon, *Roosevelt*, II, 447-50. Reports as to what Roosevelt said to Nye and members of the Munitions Committee vary in wording, but they agree on the point that the President emphasized a desire for laws to keep the United States out of war and encouraged Nye to introduce legislation. Roosevelt's suggestion differed from the State Department's aim of getting authority to regulate the arms trade so the American government could cooperate in controlling the world traffic in arms. In any event, Roosevelt's remarks, reported by the British Embassy as a statement that legislation to take "the war out of neutrality" was more important than legislation to "take the profts out of war," was construed by Nye as a request to submit legislative recommendations, and Nye proceeded accordingly. RBFO, A 3483/3483/45, F.O. 371/18772. Whether Roosevelt was expressing a thought representing a matured conclusion or whether it was just a chance remark is not known, but the circumstances and setting are similar to the President's revelation of unconditional surrender as a war policy in 1943. To this writer, it appears that in both cases Roosevelt had not planned a statement beforehand, but when the subject came up he expressed his real feelings. C.f. James MacGregor Burns, *Roosevelt, The Soldier of Freedom 1940-1945*, New York, 1970, p. 383.

with the passage of laws restricting the President's activities.[13]

The real battle over neutrality legislation developed after the State Department proposal was presented to Congress. Concerned about the danger of war which could result from the expected confrontation between Italy and Ethiopia, the administration desired to have at hand the temporary authority to shut off the flow of war supplies to Italy. Efforts to secure this power promptly aroused the ire of the Nye group who suspected, correctly, the president was interested in cooperating in an international program to levy economic sanctions. In the ensuing struggle, complicated by a number of unrelated domestic political factors, the administration forces conducted themselves poorly. Amidst the greatest possible confusion, Senator Key Pittman, Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, maneuvered through Congress a bill supposedly representing compromises by all factions. It was a curious conglomeration of contradictory provisions taken from the major features of several different neutrality proposals, some rewritten by Pittman, and it satisfied no one. Roosevelt's advisors had a number of initial objections to the bill, although the President was not greatly upset by it. At first most advisors considered the act restrictive, but within a short time they and the President were looking with interest at studies which suggested that the neutrality law was a most useful weapon of diplomacy.[14]

The operative section of the 1935 act provided that "upon the outbreak or during the progress of war" between foreign states "the President shall proclaim such fact." Thereafter, shipments of arms, implements, and munitions of war to the belligerents were unlawful.

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[13]Divine, *Illusion*, pp. 81-121; Cordell Hull, *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull*, New York, 1948, I, 397-417; Nixon, *Roosevelt*, II, 470-76, 558-59, 578-79; Joseph C. Green to Hull, July 9, 1935; Memorandum by Green, July 22, 1935; J.C.G. to Davis, Aug. 24, 1935, Davis MSS, box 2. Green became the first head of the Munitions Control Board established by the 1935 act.

[14]Nixon, *Roosevelt*, II, 601-02, 605-07, 607-10, 632-33, 634-37; Green to Moffat, Oct. 12, 1934, Moffat MSS. New York *Times*, Aug. 22, 23, 24, 1935, p. 1; Aug. 25, 1935, p. 5; Hull to Stimson, Aug. 22, 1935, Hull MSS, folder 85; New York Herald *Tribune*, Aug 28, 1935, p. 1. For the interpretative studies of the Neutrality Act of 1935 see Moore to Roosevelt, Aug. 28, 1935; Hull to Roosevelt, Aug. 29, 1935; Moore to Roosevelt, Dec. 31, 1935, Nixon, *Roosevelt*, II, 623-28, 630-32, III, 149-50; M.F. Perkins, State Department Historical Advisor, to Hull, Aug. 26, 1935; New York Bar Association Draft Report, n.d., Hull MSS, folder 356; Hornbeck to R. Walton Moore, Sept. 28, 1935, to Hull, Oct. 3, 1935, Hornbeck MSS, box 97; Clyde Eggleton, "The Recent Neutrality Legislation," *New York University Law Quarterly Review*, XIII (November, 1935), 721-81; "American Neutrality Reconsidered," *Columbia Law Review*, XXXVI (January, 1936), 105-44, esp. pp. 124-28.

It was mandatory in that the embargo applied to all parties to a conflict, discretionary because the President did not have to invoke the act until he wanted to. The freedom this allowed was not lost on Congressmen determined to restrict the President's powers, and during the 1936 struggle for revision they were pleased to find Roosevelt agreeable to a change bringing the embargo provision into effect "whenever the President shall find that there exists a state of war." This wording, supposedly more restrictive, really allowed the Chief Executive more latitude than before. An addition made in 1937 also placed civil wars large enough to endanger world peace under the statute.

The 1935 law created a National Munitions Control Board empowered to license and supervise arms shipments. Armaments manufacturers and traders, dependent upon government contracts for their business, hastened to comply with the act. As a result, for the first time in American history, the arms industry came under direct government regulation in peacetime. The statute also attempted to make certain the United States would never again be caught up in the involvements which preceded America's entry into the First World War. Carrying munitions abroad for use by belligerents, prohibiting the entry of submarines of a belligerent into American ports, warning American citizens against travel on vessels of a belligerent, prohibiting loans to belligerent governments (added in 1936), but allowing them short term credits (a 1937 compromise), and the banning of armaments on American merchant ships all were intended to isolate Americans, and the country, from war. But in 1937 a two year trial cash and carry provision was added, allowing trade in wartime. Because there were so many different features within the acts, coming into force under separate circumstances, the President could pick, choose, and then justify whatever he did in the name of neutrality.[15]

Roosevelt practiced neutrality selectively, first, by finding in existence a war between Italy and Ethiopia, invoking the neutrality act and shutting off arms shipments, thereby effectively discriminating against the Italian interests. Although disheartened at the failure of the collective effort to impose sanctions against agression—

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[15]49 Stat. 1081 (1935); 49 Stat. 1152 (1936); 50 Stat. 121 (1937). Divine, *Illusion*, p. 158, contends that the 1936 revision of the operative clause was restrictive. Phillips Bradley, "International Relations," *American Political Science Review*, III (Feb., 1937), 100-13, argues persuasively that the change allowed more discretion.

which immediately reinforced his conviction that a more internationalist American policy was unworkable—he was pleased at the popularity and usefulness of the neutrality statute. It was a device, he said, which could keep America out of war yet allow the United States to refuse aid to predator nations. During the Spanish Civil War Roosevelt laid a similar embargo, again executing a foreign policy decision under a neutrality act. But in the Sino-Japanese conflict he conveniently did not find a state of war to exist because the prohibitions which would automatically follow his declaration would aid Japan against China. Hull explained that it would be unneutral for the United States to formally recognize a state of war when the nations involved had not done so.[16]

Between 1938 and 1941 Roosevelt moved step by step (or, as James MacGregor Burns describes it, he took a bold step forward

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[16]For American policy during the Italo-Ethiopian crisis see *FRUS 1934*, II, 754-74; *FRUS 1935*, I, 595-857 Hull, *Memoirs*, I, 431-34; Rosenman, *Papers*, IV, 373-75; Nixon, *Roosevelt*, II, 493-95, 547, 610-14, III, several items, pp. 3-42; Hornbeck to Hull, Oct. 5, 1935, Hornbeck MSS, Secretary of State 1932-1937; Department of State, *Press Releases 1935*, p. 382. Roosevelt expressed his delight at the usefulness of the neutrality act in a number of letters. See Nixon, *Roosevelt*, II, 43-44, 84-85, 94-95, 102-03, 121, III, 102-03; Roosevelt MSS, PSF: State Dept. (1933-35), PSF: Poland ('36-'38). The British government fully understood that Roosevelt was willing to assist in imposing sanctions against Italy. However, British policy fundamentally was not to risk war but to isolate Italy diplomatically and get Mussolini to settle on British terms. When at the brink, fearful of not getting French support, the British government rejected collective action involving force. Instead, under the plan authored by foreign Secretary Sir Samuel Hoar and French Premier Pierre Laval, Mussolini was offered a method of allowing Italy to take by treaty what she was taking in war. The evolution of British policy may be traced in RBFO, A. 7729/3483/45, F.O. 371/18772; J 3806/1/1, F.O. 371/19125; J 5429/1/1, F.O. 371/19139; J 8911/1/1, J 8758/1/1, F.O. 371/19166; J 2381/97/1, F.O. 371/19186. A lengthy review and analysis of Britain role in the crisis was conducted in 1936. See the undated memorandum filed with "Future Policy of His Majesty's Government in Regard to the League of Nations," June 3, 1936, W 5075/79/98, F.O. 371/20473. Anthony Eden, *Facing the Dictators*, Boston, 1962; Robert A. Friedlander, "New Light on the Anglo-American Reaction to the Ethiopian War 1935-36," *Mid America*, XLV (April, 1963), 115-25; and Henderson B. Braddick, "The Hoar-Laval Plan: A Study in International Politics," *Journal of Modern History*, XXXIV (March, 1962), 64-73, round out the story. Friedlander's high evaluation of Ambassador Breckenridge Long's influence in turning Roosevelt away from imposing oil sanctions should be balanced against the items in *FRUS 1935*, I, 667-69, 801-07; Nixon, *Roosevelt*, III, 28-29. Roosevelt, not inclined in 1934 and the first half of 1935 to place much hope in getting any results by cooperating with Britain, had in the Italo-Ethiopian crisis reversed his policy. Revelation of the Hoar-Laval proposal left the President disillusioned, and he returned to his former position. Nixon, *Roosevelt*, III, 111-12, 130, 152-56; Roosevelt to Cudahay, Jan. 21, 1936, Roosevelt MSS, PSF: Poland 36-38. For the later application of the neutrality statutes see Department of State, *Peace and War*, pp. 322-23, 329; Department of State, *Press Releases, 1937*, pp. 223-24, 227.

then executed his customary backward hop) away from his policy of isolating the United States from war. His goal of achieving national security did not change, now only he intended to realize it by seeing to the survival of the Atlantic democracies. As his foreign policy shifted, domestic critics tore at him, friendly nations requested faster and more effective action, while unfriendly governments concluded alliances and issued warnings. To justify himself in the face of all these admonishments, Roosevelt reported to the American people that his sole aim was to implement their desire to be powerful and peaceful. Neutrality became the President's sheathed sword and his shield.[17]

In any discussion of neutrality laws and their effect on foreign policy, several related but separable questions have been comingled. One of these, and by far the easiest to answer conclusively, is whether it was essential to have a statutory policy to maintain neutrality. The answer is that many elements in American society, including the President, thought it was. The real question here is not whether neutrality legislation was considered desirable but what form it should take. When asked directly, Roosevelt usually fudged this issue, but he definitely wanted laws which would protect him from drifting into the kind of involvements which bedeviled Woodrow Wilson.

The second question is whether or not Roosevelt felt the neutrality acts cut into his powers. He did not protest the laws; his critical comments were directed at the groups in Congress who were unwilling to expand his authority. This reaction stands in sharp contrast to the President's bitter denunciations of the Supreme Court and his violent attacks against legislators he considered obstructionists. This denial by Congress may be considered restrictive; however, no other president, except when granted the prerogative for a limited time, had ever possessed the right to impose domestic controls over commodity exports to distinguish between aggressor and victim. Yet, during the period, Roosevelt gave the impression that he agreed with the assumption that the statutes directed his policy. The evidence on this point is mixed, but it appears more accurate to say that in the conduct of his foreign policy he was concerned with the

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[17]Burns, *Roosevelt*, p. 132.

implied check of public opinion rather than with legal restrictions.[18]

The third question is whether or not the neutrality laws conflicted with Roosevelt's foreign policy goals. They didn't. Initially, the legislation aided the Chief Executive by allowing him to make the American presence felt while removing the United States from zones of hostilities. The use of neutrality in this manner is often described as a rejection of the doctrine of collective security by the United States, but it wasn't. The President never had that alternative. The nations who later formed the wartime allied coalition were unwilling in the mid-1930's to muster for defense at the point of conflict, neither did they have the political solidarity, moral community, and confidence to consider aggression directed against one

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[18]C.f. Roosevelt's reactions to neutrality legislation and the court's decision in A.L.A. Schecter Poultry Corporation v. United States. 295 U.S. 495. Nixon, *Roosevelt*, II, 634-37; E. Roosevelt, ed., *Letters*, I, 506-07; Rosenman, *Papers*, IV, 200-20. Roosevelt's views on the powers of the presidency may be found in the narrative accompanying the documents published in this series in Vol. II, 202-06, 246-47, 247-48, Vol. IV, 9-10. The question of what constitutes public opinion is very delicate. Everyone seems to know what it was, but all sources produce more interpretation than evidence. In two isolated events, the 1935 proposals that the United States adhere to the World Court protocols and the 1937 debate over Louis Ludlow's war referendum resolution, there appears to have been a popular reaction against a foreign policy of entanglement. But upon investigation, what is called public opinion during the World Court fight turns out to be the expression of the vociferous groups. The administration recognized this, although it was not certain how to deal with the phenomenon. See New York *Times*, Jan. 30, 1935, p. 1; Jan. 31, p. 18; Feb. 13, IV, 3; Feb. 12, p. 20; Washington *Post*, Feb. 6, 1935, p. 8; Nixon, *Roosevelt*, II, 381. Roosevelt said that Walter Lippmann had provided the best explanation of what had happened in the World Court fight, but Lippmann's analysis, which appeared in the New York *Herald-Tribune* on Feb. 2, 1935, was based on the assumption that an overwhelming isolationist sentiment existed. This also happened to be one of Lippmann's convictions in 1935, and his demonstration of proof is a tautological argument. The war referendum is a different matter. The Ludlow proposal, calling for a popular vote to decide on a declaration of war (H.J. Res. 199, printed in *Congressional Record*, 81, April 6, 1937, p. 3198) was almost forced out of House Committee by a discharge petition after the Japanese attack in China, Roosevelt's "Quarantine Speech," Italy's exit from the League, and the bombing of the U.S. gunboat *Panay*. Supporters of the resolution offered public opinion polls showing that 73% of the American people favored a referendum on war, 73% thought there would be another war, 56% felt the United States could stay out, and 69% were in favor of stricter neutrality laws. See *Congressional Record*, 82, Nov. 22, 1937, pp. 242-48; Washington *Post*, Jan. 7, 1938, p. 2; and similar items Hadley Cantril, ed., *Public Opinion 1935-1946*, Princeton, 1951, pp. 966 ff. The polls also showed the American people favored national defense, resisting aggression, and maintaining peace by all honorable means. In the party platforms for 1936 the Democrats, in addition, dedicated themselves to taking profits out of war and being on guard against being drawn into a conflict by political commitments to international banking or private trade. The Republicans vowed that maintaining peace meant not forging alliances. The Communist party came out in favor of collective security and the Socialists pledged to oppose rearmament. Kirk H. Porter and Donald Bruce Johnson, Compilers, *National Party Platforms 1840-1956*, Urbana, 1956, pp. 359-69. In sum, a strong public opinion now reinforced the neutrality position Roosevelt had taken in 1935.

party worth a declaration of war by all parties. What Roosevelt rejected in 1935 was cooperative or coalition diplomacy with Great Britain, which, he felt, offered many risks without corresponding advantages.[19]

Between 1937 and 1939, even though denied discretionary powers to embargo exports selectively, the neutrality legislation did not hinder Roosevelt in his search for methods of opposing aggression without going to war. His real difficulties were three: no one could figure out how to check the dictators without fighting, the United States was unprepared for war, and not everybody felt a war would necessarily have to involve the United States. Other than neutrality, Roosevelt had no policy at this time and thus could not (or felt he could not) mobilize public opinion to support an alternative. But upon the outbreak of World War II, he asked for new legislation and after a struggle, but without serious compromises, successfully overrode the isolationist bloc in Congress and obtained the authority to supply aid to friendly governments. This new foreign policy repealed the principle of neutrality in the name of neutrality. As practiced, Roosevelt's policy rapidly distilled into supplying all aid to the allies at the risk of war.[20]

The final question is whether or not Congress curtailed the President's freedom by placing mandatory restrictions within the neutrality acts. The interesting point raised here is what would have happened had Roosevelt openly violated one of these provisions. Any answer has to be a hypothetical construction because to date, the question of the constitutionality of an act proscribing executive powers in the field of foreign relations has never been decided. But in 1936, in delivering an opinion on a related subject, the Supreme Court defined the President's authority very broadly. According to the Court, the sovereign powers of the American government could be divided into internal and external aspects, with essential differences

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[19]On collective security, the examination by Kenneth W. Thompson, "Collective Security Reexamined," *American Political Science Review*, XLVII (Sept., 1935), 753-72, still holds up.

[20]Edward S. Corwin, *The President, Office and Powers*, New York, 1948, pp. 245-48, lists the major decisions taken after the fall of France in 1940 by which the status of the United States changed from neutral to quasi belligerent. Charles A. Beard, *President Roosevelt and the Coming of the War, 1941*, New Haven, 1948, pp. 3-9, 407, 409-15, 574-84, in indicting Roosevelt for lying to the American people, provides a much longer resumé. The remaining restrictive provisions in the 1939 Neutrality Act were repealed on Nov. 13, 1941. See also the provisions of the Neutrality Act of Nov. 4, 1939, 76th Cong., 2d sess., *Public Resolution* No. 54. Burns, *Roosevelt*, pp. 3-167, provides the best general treatment of the President's policy aims from 1939-1941.

between them. While the states and the people share in domestic sovereignty, in external affairs the federal authority is complete, and only the President is empowered to exercise it. The Court did not rule out the possibility that some forms of restrictive legislation might be constitutional; it merely said the question remained to be decided. But as the Court then went on to admonish Congress that it would be unwise to lay down narrowly defined standards by which the President is to be governed, there is at least the suggestion that a constitutional test would have been resolved in favor of the Chief Executive.[21]

The neutrality laws did not preselect Roosevelt's foreign policy, neither did they control his responses to the great crises in the international order. All the debates over the wisdom of passing neutrality legislation and the provisions of the statutes enacted not withstanding, nothing changed the simple fact that in the conduct of foreign relations the President was the nation's plenary and single agent.

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[21]Curtiss-Wright Export, et al. v. United States: 299 U.S. 311-29; 81 U.S., Law Ed., pp. 255-70; The case began with the return of an indictment in the federal court for the Southern District of New York. Development of the arguments over the Chief Executive's powers may be traced in printed documents. See 14 F Supp. 230 and U.S. Congress, Senate, Special Committee Investigating the Munitions Industry, *Hearings* Pursuant to S. Res. 206, 73d Cong., 2d sess., 1934, 39 Volumes, XXXIX, 13373-90. For analysis see Temple Law Quarterly, XI (April, 1937), pp. 418-21) *Fordham Law Review*, VI (May, 1937), 303-06; *Texas Law Review*, XV (April, 1937), 372-73; *Wisconsin Law Review*, XII (April, 1937), 400-02. Corwin, *President*, pp. 206-74 covers the broader subject of the president's conduct of foreign relations. Only once did a neutrality act become the subject of a court decision. In 1939, the government successfully contended that the neutrality statute applied to Filipinos the same prohibitions affecting American citizens. The presiding judge upheld the constitutionality of the Act of 1939 as a valid exercise of the executive's sovereign power over foreign affairs. 37 F Supp. 268; Hackworth, *Digest*, VII, 643-45.

AMERICA, GERMANY, AND THE COLD WAR, 1945-1949*

BIRDSALL S. VIAULT

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The roots of the Cold War lie deeply embedded in the history of relations between Soviet Russia and the western powers since the October Revolution. In more immediate terms, however, the Cold War grew out of East-West tensions after 1945, especially in eastern Europe and in Germany. Today, more than a quarter of a century later, much of the passion has gone out of the Cold War, and the West has reconciled itself to a Communized eastern Europe. But Germany continues as the last major remnant of the Cold War in Europe.

The traditional approach to the history of the Cold War has attributed the conflict to the aggressive, expansionist tendencies of the Soviet Union, which evoked a defensive reaction on the part of the West, led by the United States.[1] This view has been challenged by a movement of revision, which portrays Soviet policy in a more favorable light and, in its more extreme form, assumes the best in analyzing Soviet policies and motives, while assuming the worst about American policies and motives.[2]

This paper, through its analysis of the course of East-West relations in Germany from 1945 to 1949, seeks to restore some balance to the Cold War debate. It proceeds on the basis that the German question cannot be considered in isolation from broader Cold War issues and that events in Germany both influenced, and were influenced by, the course of East-West relations generally. It also suggests that developments in Germany and in the Cold War as a whole can be best understood as the consequence of the fear and suspicions which existed on both sides and of the resultant defensive postures which were adopted.

In a brief paper, it is impossible to discuss the course of Allied

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[1]This view is presented, for example, in John Spanier, *American Foreign Policy Since World War II*, second revised edition, New York, 1965.

[2]Representative of the strongly revisionist accounts are D. F. Fleming, *The Cold War and Its Origins, 1917-1960*, 2 vols., Garden City, N. Y., 1961 and Gar Alperovitz, *Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam*, New York, 1965. More moderate reexaminations are provided by Andre Fontaine, *History of the Cold War*, 2 vols., New York, 1968 and by Louis J. Halle in his magisterial *The Cold War as History*, New York, 1968.

discussions on the German question during World War II. But note should be made of the Yalta Conference of February 1945 and its decisions affecting Germany. At Yalta, discussion of the German question involved four issues: the approval of the occupation zones and control machinery proposed by the European Advisory Commission, with debate centering on the proposal for French participation, the establishment of a western frontier for Poland at Germany's expense, dismemberment, and reparations.

The British strongly desired French involvement in Germany, as a part of their effort to foster France's reemergence as a factor in the European balance of power. President Roosevelt initially opposed the British suggestion that France be granted an occupation zone and an equal voice in the Allied Control Council, as did Stalin. But when Roosevelt changed his mind, Stalin readily followed suit.[3] The Soviet leader apparently did not care one way or the other and agreed with Roosevelt, perhaps in the hope of gaining a few negotiating chips which he could cash in later on an issue of greater concern. Paradoxically, although this decision was reached with a minimum of discord, it would remain of importance in the future, long after the issues of dismemberment and reparations had been all but forgotten.

On the matter of Poland's western frontier, Stalin proved to be much less pliable, insisting on the line of the Oder and Neisse rivers. Churchill and Roosevelt refused to make any specific commitments, and the final statement represented the extent of disagreement. While recognizing that "Poland must receive substantial accessions of territory in the North and the West," the "final delimitation of the Western frontier of Poland should . . . await the Peace Conference."[4]

During the course of wartime discussions, the Allies had first been inclined to favor the dismemberment of Germany and had then begun to lose interest in it. Although the Soviets appeared to regard the issue as of secondary importance, they pressed for an agreement on the specifics of dismemberment. Their adamant negotiating probably resulted from their not entirely unfounded fear that the western powers, especially Great Britain, would oppose the destruction of Germany's industrial strength and would instead concentrate on rebuilding Anglo-German commercial relations. Once again, Churchill

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[3]*Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers: The Conferences of Malta and Yalta, 1945*, Washington, 1955, pp. 576, 616-618, 710-711, 899-900 (hereafter cited as *Yalta Documents*).

[4]*Ibid.*, pp. 905-907.

and Roosevelt refused to make specific commitments, beyond agreeing to include the word "dismemberment" in the terms of surrender. The method of dismemberment" in the terms of surrender. The method of dismembering Germany was assigned to a special commission to work out.[5] This commission soon went far afield in procedural matters, and when the Allies continued to lose interest in dismemberment, the commission ceased functioning by the autumn of 1945.[6]

Although the question of dismemberment quickly passed into oblivion, the issue of reparations did not. The German invasion had devastated much of Russia, and the Soviets called for substantial German reparations in kind, proposing a total of $20 billion, with half of that amount going to the U. S. S. R. Churchill was concerned about the role of the German economy in postwar Europe and thus opposed the Soviet demand, arguing that "if you wished a horse to pull a wagon . . . you would at least have to give it fodder." An angry Stalin retorted that "care should be taken to see that the horse did not turn around and kick you" and called on Churchill to "say so frankly" if he opposed reparations for Russia. President Roosevelt was sympathetic to the Soviet proposals, but the British remained adamantly opposed to them. After bitter debate, the three statesmen agreed to the establishment of a Reparations Commission to work out the details. The Soviets and Americans agreed that this Commission should take the proposed $20 billion sum as a basis of discussion, with the British in opposition.[7] The Yalta Protocol on Reparations reflected the Allies' views on an issue which would plague relations among the victors for the next several years. While there was no commitment to the sum of $20 billion except as a basis for discussion, the United States was prepared to accept the Soviet proposal. The only reason why the American commitment was not more complete was because of British objections. The Soviets had reason to believe that the United States did in fact support the $20 billion figure and would continue to do so and, understandably, they became bitter when the American position shifted.

The issues which the Yalta Conference had left unresolved came before the Potsdam Conference which began its deliberations in mid-July 1945. In the five months since Yalta, the Soviet pattern of domi-

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[5]*Ibid.*, pp. 611-615, 656-657, 660, 700-701, 978.

[6]*Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1945*, III, Washington, 1968, 160-368.

[7]*Yalta Documents*, pp. 620-622, 631-633, 807-809, 812, 885, 901-903, 909, 914-916, 978-979.

nation in eastern Europe had begun to emerge, and tensions among the wartime allies were growing.

The Potsdam conferees readily affirmed the Yalta accord on occupation zones and for the creation of a four-power Allied Control Council, which would coordinate policies for the four zones.[8] Bitter debate ensued, however, on the issues of reparations and the western boundary of Poland. On the former issue, the Soviets proved to be tractable and agreed to drop, at least temporarily, their original insistence on a total reparations bill of $20 billion and, indeed, on any fixed sum. The Potsdam agreement provided that each power would exact reparations from its own zone and, in addition, the Soviets would receive fifteen percent of the industrial equipment removed from the western zones in exchange for raw materials from their zone, plus an additional ten percent without any counter-deliveries. The Soviets' willingness to abandon their original demands was encouraged by Secretary of State James F. Byrnes' implication that, in return for Soviet concessions on reparations, the United States would support the Soviet proposals regarding the Polish frontier. The Soviets thus gave way on what had become for them the less important issue, especially since they had apparently been assured of substantial reparations in some form.[9]

As the Soviets viewed the future, they could not be certain that Germany would not be reunited within a few years, and they viewed the cession of a sizable portion of German territory to Poland as one sure way of reducing Germany's potential future strength. To emphasize their determination, the Soviets had already placed the portion of their zone east of the line of the Oder and Western Neisse rivers under Polish administration. Curiously, if the Soviets had been willing to settle for a smaller cession of territory to Poland, leaving, for example, Stettin and part of Silesia in their own zone, the German Democratic Republic would today be a more viable state. The western powers were reluctant to place the Polish frontier at the Oder-Western Neisse line. They were no better able than the Soviets to divine the future and could not anticipate West Germany's postwar economic recovery nor the fact that western Germany would be able to absorb several million refugees from the east. They thus feared that the

[8] *Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers: The Conference of Berlin, 1945*, II, Washington, 1960, 1502-1504 (hereafter cited as *Potsdam Documents*).

[9] *Ibid.*, pp. 510-520, 1505-1506; James F. Byrnes, *Speaking Frankly*, New York, 1947, 79-86; Harry S. Truman, *Year of Decisions*, Garden City, N. Y., 1955, pp. 400-401, 404-406.

amputation of a sizable portion of eastern Germany would throw their own zones into economic chaos. The Potsdam conferees made no final settlement of the Polish frontier, but the Soviets' determined negotiating won a substantial acceptance of their wishes. Pending the "final determination" of Poland's western frontier at the peace conference, the area claimed by Poland would remain under Polish administration.[10]

An examination of the other Potsdam agreements concerning Germany demonstrates the lack of any clear agreement among the conferees. The Potsdam Protocol, for example, called for the decentralization of the Germany economy, in order to eliminate "the present excessive concentration of economic power," but there was no attempt to define "excessive." All industry not required for "permitted production" would be removed, but "permitted production" was not defined. In all zones, the German population would be treated equally, but only "so far as is practicable." Local self-government should be reestablished through elected councils, but only to the extent "consistent with military security and the purposes of military occupation." While basic civil liberties were guaranteed, this guarantee would be subject to "the necessity for maintaining military security." The Protocol further provided that Germany was to be treated as an economic unit, governed by "common policies," but then added that "in applying these policies account shall be taken, where appropriate, of varying local conditions." Finally, the Potsdam Protocol provided no clear distinction between the issues concerning Germany as a whole, which would be administered by the four-power Allied Control Council, and matters which came within the jurisdiction of each zonal commander.[11]

The Potsdam Protocol was designed to provide the guidelines for the Control Council to follow in unanimously determining the specific policies to be executed. In the best of circumstances, with harmonious relations prevailing among the four powers, the Protocol would be subject to varying interpretations. When the occupying powers became divided in their basic attitudes and interests, the Potsdam Protocol became the basis for interminable wrangling.

While the Potsdam Conference was in progress, the Allied Control Council was established in Berlin and set up its machinery with little difficulty. But the first substantive problems quickly appeared.

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[10] *Potsdam Documents*, p. 1509.
[11] *Ibid.*, pp. 1501-1505.

Fearing a restoration of German power, the French frequently resorted to their veto to obstruct any effort to create central administrative agencies. This French obstructionism, in turn, fed Soviet suspicions, and Marshal Sokolovsky, the Soviet commander, told his American counterpart, General Lucius Clay, that "France was receiving too much financial assistance from the United States to maintain such strong opposition unless it was with our acquiescence."[12]

It is difficult to be certain about Soviet intentions toward Germany in the period from 1945 to 1948. The traditional Cold War view is that the Soviets had undertaken a consistent and determined effort directed toward the eventual communization of Germany. From what we now know—and that, unfortunately, is all too little—Soviet policy makers were uncertain as to what their policy should be, apart from supporting Poland's territorial claims and exacting as much in reparations as possible. In the political sphere, Soviet policy was inconsistent. Wolfgang Leonhard, a German Communist who returned from Moscow in the company of Wilhelm Pieck and Walter Ulbricht, recalled the instructions he and his associates received in the spring of 1945:

> Our political task was not to consist of establishing socialism in Germany or encouraging a socialist development. On the contrary, this must be condemned and resisted as a dangerous tendency. Germany was on the threshold of a bourgeois-democratic transformation . . . The policy was therefore to support this process and to repudiate every kind of socialist slogan which under present day conditions could be nothing more but pure demagogy.[13]

A few weeks later, Leonhard was surprised when the Soviet authorities permitted the establishment of political parties on a zonal level.

> The creation of independent Communist and Socialist Parties was in direct contradiction with the directives which we had received in Moscow in March and April, 1945 [he wrote]. . . . At that time we had been told that political activity could only be developed initially in the context of a large-scale comprehensive anti-Fascist movement . . . Now, on the contrary, what was being talked of was the founda-

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[12]Lucius D. Clay, *Decision in Germany*, London, 1950, p. 39.
[13]Wolfgang Leonhard, *Child of the Revolution*, Gateway edition, Chicago, 1958, p. 352.

> tion of political parties. Earlier, again, it had been said that land reform could not be undertaken before the beginning of 1946. Now we were to carry out the land reform immediately after the foundation of the party in the summer of 1945.[14]

The Societs clearly were not operating on the basis of a consistent plan, and the precise purposes of shifts in Soviet policy remain a matter of speculation, although it is possible that growing western hostility to the satellization of eastern Europe may have encouraged Moscow to seek to add Germany to the Soviet's defensive perimeter. By the spring of 1946, Stalin and the Soviet leaders were telling "the Bulgars and the Yugoslavs . . . that all of Germany must be ours, that is, Soviet, Communist."[15]

Even during the first year of occupation, differences among the zones became increasingly evident. In the summer of 1945, the four political parties authorized in the Soviet zone established a united front, similar to the political system in the eastern European satellites, and the Communists then initiated a campaign for a merger with the Social Democrats. A bitter debate followed, but in April 1946, the Social Democratic and Communist parties in the Soviet zone merged into the Socialist Unity Party, while the Social Democratic Party in the western zones maintained its independence. This was a definite setback to any Soviet hopes of gaining a predominant position in all of Germany. The Soviets also pressed forward with land reform, although there was no talk of collectivization. Given the attitudes of the western powers, together with the typically smaller land holdings of western Germany, such action was impossible in the western zones, and four-power discussions of land reform produced only further discord. While nationalization of industry progressed in the Soviet zone, the Americans remained committed to free enterprise and prevented nationalization, although the British Labor government would have preferred such a course. Differences also appeared in education, as the Soviets moved to laicize and statize the schools of their zone, while in the western zones the educational system remained largely church-run.

Even greater differences developed between the Soviets and the western powers over reparations. While the Soviets carried out massive removals of capital equipment, they refused to provide the

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[14] *Ibid.*, p. 413.

[15] Milovan Djilas, *Conversations with Stalin*, New York, 1962, p. 153.

western powers with any information concerning their removals and, faced with enormous needs, they did not fulfill their commitments regarding deliveries of food and raw materials from their zone in return for a part of the industrial equipment received from the western zones. The western powers were not prepared to support Soviet recovery while, at the same time, maintaining a strict adherence to the Potsdam accords on the levels of industry would prevent any economic recovery in the western zones, making them a liability to the occupying powers. Angered by the Soviets' failure to make deliveries, General Clay declared on April 26, 1946, that "the boundaries of our zone gave us a great part of the scenic beauty of Germany but had been accepted only on the understanding that the economic resources of all Germany would be available to Germany as a whole." After a final attempt to reach agreement failed, General Clay, on May 3, 1946, suspended reparations deliveries to the Soviet Union.[16] They were never resumed, and the Potsdam agreement to treat Germany as an economic unit became a dead letter.

As disagreement mounted, the Allied Control Council became less capable of coordinating occupation policy and became a scene of discord, reproducing on German issues the larger areas of contention between the United States and the Soviet Union. Commenting on a report of the Control Council in early 1947, General Clay remarked that it recorded "few agreed conclusions." He added:

> It did record the differences in viewpoint both as to what had occurred and what remained to be done. It did lay down in black on white clearly and succinctly the wide divergences which had taken place in the attempt to administer Germany as a unit by unanimous consent of the representatives of the four occupying powers.[17]

If the occupying powers had been motivated by the necessity of cooperation which the war had provided, the differences in ideology and methods might have been overcome. But Germany stood at the center of Europe, in more than a geographical sense, and the growing disagreements between the Soviets and Americans in other areas served to intensify the discord in Germany, where the two sides were in immediate and continuing contact with each other.

Just as the Allied Control Council became the scene of wrangling,

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[16]Clay, *Decision in Germany*, pp. 120-122; *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946*, V, Washington, 1969, 545-548.

[17]Clay, *Decision in Germany*, p. 145.

so, too, did the Council of Foreign Ministers' discussions of the German question. As early as September 1945 in London, Secretary of State Byrnes proposed to Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov the conclusion of a twenty-five year, four-power treaty to insure German disarmament. Molotov made no commitment beyond remarking that it was "a very interesting idea."[18] In Moscow in December, Stalin indicated his endorsement of the proposal, but at the Paris meeting of the foreign ministers in the spring of 1946, Molotov insisted, much to Byrnes' surprise, that the treaty would serve only to postpone German disarmament until the end of the occupation. He charged the western powers with failing to carry out their existing commitments for demilitarization and raised a host of other issues which convinced Byrnes that Molotov "had no idea of discussing the treaty in a serious manner but was simply looking for excuses for delay."[19] Examining the reasons for Molotov's rejection of a proposal which Stalin had appeared to endorse, Byrnes believed that "the Soviet High Command or Politburo concluded they did not want the United States involved in the maintenance of European security for the next twenty-five or forty years."[20] From what we know of Stalin's rule, neither the High Command nor the Politburo was in a position to overrule his decisions. Whatever the Soviets' reasons for rejecting the proposed treaty, the United States became increasingly convinced of the improbability of reaching agreement with the Soviets on Germany. This conviction was strengthened when Molotov told Byrnes in July 1946 that he was in no hurry to conclude a German peace treaty.[21] During the same meeting, Molotov presented both an appeal to German sentiment, by condemning the long-since buried American plan for the pastoralization of Germany, and a violent attack upon American policy generally. Molotov demanded four-power control of the Ruhr and called for the establishment of a German regime that would "be able to extirpate the remnants of Fascism" and meet the Soviet demands for reparations.[22]

The Americans and British opposed four-power control of the Ruhr, believing that this would provide only another forum for the interminable wrangling already characteristic of four-power dealings

[18]Byrnes, *Speaking Frankly*, pp. 100-101; *Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1945*, II, Washington, 1967, pp. 267-268.

[19]Byrnes, *Speaking Frankly*, pp. 171-175; *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946*, II, Washington, 1970, 146-147; Robert Murphy, *Diplomat Among Warriors*, Garden City, N. Y., 1964, p. 301.

[20]Byrnes, *Speaking Frankly*, p. 176.

[21]*Ibid.*, p. 198.

[22]*Ibid.*, pp. 179-180; *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946*, II, 869-873.

and that it would destroy the Ruhr's industries which were vital to Europe's economic health. Frustrated by the collapse of efforts to fulfill the Potsdam commitment to treat Germany as an economic unit, Byrnes announced on July 11, 1946, the readiness of the United States to merge its zone with any of the other zones. The British promptly accepted the proposal,[23] and the economic "Bizonia" became effective at the beginning of 1947.

The fruitless negotiations of the foreign ministers convinced Byrnes to make a full statement of America's policy toward Germany. This he did at the Stuttgart Opera House on September 5, 1946, before an audience of western and German dignitaries. In a speech marking a major turning point in American history, Byrnes announced the intention of the United States to remain involved in German and European affairs. Making it clear that he did not intend to come in second to Molotov in appealing for German support, Byrnes looked forward to the time when the Germans could "take an honorable place among the members of the United Nations," and he pledged that Germany would not be deprived of the industry necessary to maintain average European living standards without outside assistance. Turning to political matters, the Secretary of State declared that the occupation had not been designed to establish "a prolonged alien dictatorship" but rather to encourage the development of political democracy. The German people should have primary responsibility for their own affairs, he said, and the United States advocated the early establishment of a German provisional government. Byrnes also condemned French proposals that the Ruhr and Rhineland be separated from Germany and insisted that no definite commitments had been made regarding Germany's eastern frontier.[24]

During the following months, the battle over Germany intensified. When the foreign ministers met in Moscow in March 1947, the lines of division were sharply drawn in Germany and elsewhere, and President Truman would, within a few days, go before Congress to proclaim his "doctrine" of aid for Greece and Turkey. The new American Secretary of State, General George C. Marshall, once again proposed a treaty for the neutralization of Germany and, once again, Molotov rejected it. The foreign ministers then proceeded to wrangle over the Ruhr and reparations and the question of a future German

[23]Byrnes, *Speaking Frankly*, pp. 194-197; *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946*, II, 897-898.

[24]Byrnes, *Speaking Frankly*, pp. 188-191; U. S. Department of State, *Germany, 1947-1949: The Story in Documents*, Washington, 1950, pp. 3-8.

government.[25] The Moscow Conference did, however, have one major result: French Foreign Minister Georges Bidault became convinced of the futility of attempting to achieve agreement with the Soviets and proceeded to move toward closer collaboration with the Americans and British.[26]

The next phase of the German problem was influenced in an unexpected way by the Marshall Plan, which became in the eyes of the increasingly suspicious Russians a major instrument in the American plan to push back the Soviet Union. The Marshall Plan, the Soviet leaders apparently concluded, was not designed simply to assist the recovery of the western European economy to stave off Communism but had an ultimately military purpose. Having fostered the development of western Europe's military potential, the Americans would then employ this strength to restore the balance of power in Europe and take Russia's gains away from her. This interpretation reconciled the two divergent Soviet views of American policy: first, that the Americans did not wish to extend their military presence in Europe and sought to avoid a direct confrontation with the Soviet Union and, second, that the Americans desired to halt Soviet expansion and roll back the Soviet sphere. In Soviet eyes, the danger was not immediate, since European recovery could not be brought about overnight. But the establishment of a West German state would be a major step toward this goal and, the Soviets feared, would soon be followed by German remilitarization. The Soviets determined to place obstacles in the course of such a development.

In an atmosphere of growing East-West hostility, the Americans and British moved further toward the economic and political integration of their zones, while the French increasingly adhered to the Anglo-American policy. Meetings of the Allied Control Council became increasingly bitter until, on March 20, 1948, Marshal Sokolovsky presented a vigorous denunciation of western policy in Germany and, without permitting a response, took advantage of his turn as chairman of the session to declare its adjournment. The Control Council never met again. Tension had already grown to the point where General Clay sensed "a change in the Soviet positions which . . . portended some Soviet action in Germany." The general abandoned his earlier belief that "war was impossible" and now believed that such

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[25]Walter Bedell Smith, *My Three Years in Moscow*, Philadelphia, 1950, pp. 217-226; Murphy, *Diplomat Among Warriors*, p. 307; U. S. Department of State, *Germany, 1947-1949*, pp. 57-63.

[26]Georges Bidault, *D'une resistance a l'autre*, Paris, 1965, pp. 148-151.

a possibility could not be precluded.[27] At the end of March, the Soviets began applying pressure at Berlin by demanding the right to examine the papers and baggage of all travellers on the western military trains entering Berlin. Clay protested against this, while the Soviets proceeded to interfere further with both rail and water traffic.[28]

In the meantime, the western powers moved forward with their plans for currency reform, convinced of the impossibility of reaching agreement with the Soviets on measures to eliminate the growing inflation. On June 18, the western powers introduced the new currency in their zones. The Soviets responded by inaugurating measures to halt all surface traffic between the western sectors of Berlin and the western zones and by cutting off all food, coal, electric current, and other supplies to west Berlin from their zone.[29]

In Washington, there was considerable apprehension that armed conflict might result and a consequent desire to avoid any provocation, while General Clay insisted on the necessity of standing firm. He did not expect armed conflict and concluded that if the Soviets did desire war, it was not because of the currency issue but because they believed the time was right for war.[30] Washington quickly recovered its composure, and the western powers indicated their determination to remain in Berlin. The airlift was established to supply the two and a quarter million inhabitants of west Berlin.

The Soviets' blockade of Berlin represented a careful selection of place and time. The western position at Berlin appeared untenable; the western powers would presumably either have to abandon the city or give way to Soviet demands. In the United States, the election campaign was growing more intense, and the British stood on the verge of a serious economic crisis. But the West refused to give way, in the conviction that the Berlin Blockade marked the first step in renewed Soviet efforts to seize all of Germany as the prelude to attempts to establish Soviet domination of the European continent.

In retrospect, it may be argued that the Berlin Blockade repre-

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[27]Clay, *Decision in Germany*, pp. 354-357; Walter Millis, ed., *The Forrestal Diaries*, New York, 1951, p. 387; Murphy, *Diplomat Among Warriors*, p. 315; U. S. Department of State, *Germany, 1947-1949*, pp. 200-201.

[28]Clay, *Decision in Germany*, pp. 358-359; Millis, *The Forrestal Diaries*, pp. 407-408; U. S. Department of State, *Germany, 1947-1949*, pp. 202-203.

[29]Clay, *Decision in Germany*, pp. 362-365; Murphy, *Diplomat Among Warriors*, pp. 315-316; U. S. Department of State, *Germany, 1947-1949*, pp. 203-204.

[30]Dean Acheson, *Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department*, New York, 1969, pp. 261-262; Clay, *Decision in Germany*, p. 366; Millis, *The Forrestal Diaries*, pp. 452-455; Murphy, *Diplomat Among Warriors*, p. 316.

sented more of a defensive measure than an aggressive act, and that the Soviets were not at this point motivated by a desire to conquer Germany or even to turn back the western currency reform. When the British commander, General Robertson, suggested to Marshall Sokolovsky on July 3 that an agreement on monetary reform might yet be worked out, Sokolovsky brushed the issue aside, declaring bluntly that the "technical difficulties" blocking traffic between Berlin and western Germany would not be resolved until the western powers abandoned their plans for a West German state.[31]

As the Blockade continued, the western powers sought a negotiated solution. On August 2, Stalin received American, British, and French representatives. In a relatively cordial mood, Stalin insisted that the Soviets had no desire to force the western powers to leave Berlin. "After all," he said, "we are still Allies." Stalin did not raise the issue of the western powers' decision to create a West German state and indicated that the Blockade would be lifted if the western powers agreed to the introduction of the Soviet zone's currency into west Berlin. The ambassadors regarded this offer as "promising."[32]

When the western representatives sought to work out the details with Molotov, their optimism quickly evaporated. The Soviets now not only desired their currency to circulate in west Berlin but refused to give any assurances on the control of credit circulation in Berlin. The western powers saw this as a threat to the economy of their sectors. Furthermore, the Soviets insisted that any communique announcing East-West agreement contain a statement that a discussion of the establishment of a West German government had taken place "in an atmosphere of mutual understanding." The western powers saw this as a trap, believing that such terminology would suggest to Germans and western Europeans that the West had agreed to abandon plans for a West German government in exchange for some concessions on the Blockade.[33]

In the following weeks and months, the negotiations continued, and they continued to be fruitless. The western airlift became increasingly more successful, and western plans for a West German state drew closer to completion. Impelled by growing fears of Soviet

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[31]Clay, *Decision in Germany*, p. 367.

[32]Smith, *My Three Years in Moscow*, p. 245; Millis, *The Forrestal Diaries*, p. 470; U. S. Department of State, *Germany, 1947-1949*, p. 210.

[33]Smith, *My Three Years in Moscow*, pp. 246-250; Millis, *The Forrestal Diaries*, p. 470; U. S. Department of State, *Germany, 1947-1949*, p. 211-213.

intentions, the western powers moved toward the establishment of NATO.

The Berlin Blockade had been designed to prevent the establishment of a West German state and to reduce what the Soviets saw as a western military threat. It had had the opposite effect. The Soviets gradually moved toward the acknowledgment of defeat, while hoping that some western concessions might still be obtained. The Blockade ended in May 1949, and the only concession the Soviets secured was an agreement for another foreign ministers' meeting, which proved as devoid of agreement on the central issues as the earlier meetings had been.

The Soviets could, however, console themselves with the thought that the Blockade had not been a total loss. The western powers had gained no new assurances on their right of access to Berlin. There has been no significant increase in American military forces in Europe and, even with its monopoly of atomic weapons, the United States had not dared risk a military confrontation. Yet the American possession of atomic weapons, with their power to devastate Soviet cities, served to nullify the Soviets' military superiority at Berlin. The Berlin crisis of 1948-1949 thus provided the first major demonstration that classical strategy had been revolutionized by the advent of nuclear weapons. The fear of nuclear destruction had, for the first time, served to freeze the *status quo*.

The year 1949 marked the end of a chapter in American-Soviet relations. Tension after 1945 had caused the Americans to increase their involvement in Europe and, under American leadership, a West German state and a North Atlantic alliance had come into being. For their part, the Soviets proceeded to establish a German Democratic Republic and to consolidate their position in the eastern European satellites. The division of Germany stood as a symbol of the unsteady stalemate in Europe. All illusions of four-power control had ended, and with them any illusion of a continuing unity of purpose which had originally joined together the wartime allies.

CONSTITUTION

I

The name of this organization shall be The South Carolina Historical Association.

II

The objects of the Association shall be to promote historical studies in the State of South Carolina; to bring about a closer relationship among persons living in this State who are interested in history; and to encourage the preservation of historical records.

III

Any person approved by the executive committee may become a member by paying $4.00 and after the first year may continue a member by paying an annual fee of $4.00.

After having been a member of the Association for twenty years, and upon reaching the age of sixty-five, any member upon notifying the Secretary-Treasurer in writing, may be elected an emeritus member by the Executive Committee. Emeritus members have all the rights and privileges of membership without being required to pay the annual dues.

Members in student status shall pay annual dues of only $2.00.

IV

The officers shall be a president, a vice-president, and a secretary and treasurer who shall be elected by ballot at each regular annual meeting. A list of nominations shall be presented by the executive committee, but nominations from the floor may be made. The officers shall have the duties and perform the functions customarily attached to their respective offices with such others as may from time to time be prescribed.

V

There shall be an executive committee made up of the officers and of three other members elected by ballot for a term of three years; at

the first election, however, one shall be elected for two years. Vacancies shall be filled by election in the same manner at the annual meeting following their occurrence. Until such time they shall be filled by appointment by the president. The duties of the executive committee shall be to fix the date and place of the annual meeting, to attend to the publication of the proceedings of the Association, to prepare a program for the annual meeting, to prepare a list of nominations for the officers of the Association as provided in Article IV, and such other duties as may be from time to time assigned to them by the Association. There shall be such other committees as the president may appoint, or be instructed to appoint, by resolution of the Association.

VI

There shall be an annual meeting of the Association at the time and place appointed by the executive committee.

VII

A. The Association shall publish annually its proceedings to be known as *The Proceedings of the South Carolina Historical Association.* It shall contain the minutes of the annual meeting together with such papers and documents selected by the executive committee as may be published without incurring a deficit. Each fifth year, beginning in 1956, the *Proceedings* shall include a copy of the constitution and by-laws of the Association.

B. All papers read at the annual meeting shall become the property of the Association except as otherwise may be provided by the executive committee.

C. The executive committee shall annually elect an editor of the *Proceedings.* He shall have authority to appoint an associate editor and shall be a member of the executive committee, but without vote.

VIII

This constitution may be amended by a two-thirds vote of the members present at the annual business meeting.